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INTRODUCTION:

A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

According to traditional doctrine, a contract plaintiff is entitled
to legal damage remedies for breach of contract unless the defendant establishes a distinct defense such as fraud.' But the equitable
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. J.D. Boston University, 1981. I
would like to thank Victoria Biedebach and Dinyar Mehta for valuable research assistance. Thanks also to Larry Alexander, Gail Heriot, Douglas Laycock, Gerald Postema,
Maimon Schwarzchild, Sarah Welling and Chris Wonnell for helpful comments on this
Article.
1. The defense of unconscionability is an exception to this statement. See infra
notes 56-57 and accompanying text. Through most of this Article, I will confine my
discussion of legal defenses against contract enforcement to traditional defenses such as
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remedy of specific performance is not available unless the contract is
fair. In the following pages, I will consider why this is so.
Traditionally, the remedy of specific performance has been subject to an extra layer of defenses that do not apply to legal contract
remedies.2 Some defenses to specific performance are based on the
practical difficulties of administering specific relief. 3 But another
type of equitable defense, which I will call a fairness defense, rests
on moral standards that have no obvious relation to the mechanics
of the remedy. Equity is said to operate on a higher moral plane
than law: it demands more meticulous conduct and a greater degree
of altruism between contracting parties, and it will not assist one
party in taking unfair advantage of the other.4 As a result, a court
fraud and mistake, as if the defense of unconscionability did not exist. I hope that by
doing this, I will be able in the end to cast some light on unconscionability.
2. The second Restatement of Contracts sets out a catalogue of defenses to specific
performance in §§ 359-68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 359-68 (1981).
Another helpful survey appears in E. YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS 101-26 (1989). Professor Yorio defends the existence of
special defenses to equitable relief, primarily because the combination of equitable defenses and defects in the damage remedy allows courts to reach a compromise between
competing interests. Id. §§ 4.5.2, 4.6. I propose a similar interpretation of equitable
defenses in subpart II(B) infra, but I do not think separate defenses to equitable relief
are an effective means of refining contract remedies.
3. Examples are difficulty of supervision and the related requirement of certainty in
the terms of the contract. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 62-65
(1973); D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 389-90, 77781 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 362, 366 (1981); E. YORIO, supra
note 2, at 45-72.

4. See Kelly v. Central Pac. R.R., 74 Cal. 557, 562, 16 P. 386, 389 (1888) (in granting equitable relief, the court can "give greater effect to the principles of morality than
can be done in ordinary cases"); Lannon v. Lamps, 53 Ill. App. 3d 145, 148, 368 N.E.2d
196, 198 (1977) (contract must be "just, reasonable and free from misapprehension or
misrepresentation"), aft'd, 80 111. App. 3d 318, 399 N.E.2d 712 (1980); Schlegel v. Moorhead, 170 Mont. 391, 397, 553 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1976) (plaintiff must present "a cause
whose ethical qualities . . . commend it to the conscience of the chancellor" (quoting
Interior Secs. Co. v. Campbell, 55 Mont. 459, 470, 178 P. 582, 585 (1919))); Pecorella v.
Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 1064, 1065, 486 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (1985)
(plaintiff must have clean hands); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS
§ 16-14, at 677 (3d ed. 1987); Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 28-32 (1950); 5A
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1162, at 207 (1964); D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 2.4, at 45, 55-56
(criticizing stricter ethical standards for equitable relief); E. FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF CONTRACTS § 387 (6th ed. 1921) ("equality and fairness... are essential in order that
the Court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in specific performance"); 1J. POMEROY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 43-67 (5th ed. 1941) (tracing the influence of moral
precepts on equity jurisprudence, but distinguishing between equity and morality); 1 J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE § 206, at 229 (13th ed. 1886) ("principles of ethics have a more extensive sway" in equity (quoting 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW 490 (1927))); E. YoRIo, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 11, § 4.4.1, at 87; Dawson, Specific Performancein France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV. 495, 523, 535-36 (1959)
(criticizing a double standard); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
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may deny specific performance on the basis of "hardship," or
"sharp practice," although the defect in the transaction is not concrete enough to establish a defense at law.5
Panco v. Rogers6 is a good example. An elderly couple (the
Pancos) signed an agreement to sell their home to the Rogers for
$5500.' The court valved the property at $10,000.8 Mr. Panco, an
elderly carpenter, was hard of hearing and lacked business experience; Mrs. Panco was "of foreign extraction" and may not have been
fluent in English.9 The Pancos thought the price in the contract was
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1155-56 (1970) (same); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code--The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 530-33 (1967) (distinguishing between
unconscionability in equity and unconscionability in the Uniform Commercial Code);
Newman, The Place and Function of Pure Equity in the Structure of Law, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 401,
404-05 (1965) (criticizing a double standard).
5. See McAllister v. Schettler, 521 A.2d 617, 623 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("Factors such as
weakened mental condition in one party, undue influence and unfairness in the contract
terms, although not of a sufficient degree to avoid the contract... will justify denial of
specific performance."), aff'd 547 A.2d 634 (Del. 1988); Lannon v. Lamps, 80 I11. App.
3d 318, 324-26, 399 N.E.2d 712, 716-18 (1980) (unequal bargaining power); Hilton v.
Nelsen, 283 N.W.2d 877, 881-83 (Minn. 1979) (unfairness or overreaching); Best v.
Culhane, 677 S.W.2d 390, 394-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (treating the defense as an equitable defense, though there may have been grounds for rescission as well); Schlegel v.
Moorhead, 170 Mont. 391, 394-97, 553 P.2d 1009, 1011-12 (1976) (concealment and
circumvention); Panco v. Rogers, 19 N.J. Super. 12, 19-20, 87 A.2d 770, 773-74 (Ch.
Div. 1952) (unilateral mistake, inadequacy of price, and general unfairness); Castaldi v.
Multer, 117 A.D.2d 699, 700, 498 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (1986); Pecorella v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 1064, 1065,486 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (1985) (any willful conduct that would be "condemned" by fair-minded people is sufficient to deny specific
relief); Smith v. Ferguson, 622 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Okla. App. 1981); In re Estate of Mihm,
345 Pa. Super. 1, 4-5, 7-10, 497 A.2d 612, 613, 615-16 (1985) (indicating at times that
the contract might be subject to rescission); Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 607, 168 S.E.2d 82
(1969) (treating the defense as an equitable defense, though there may have been
grounds for rescission as well); McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 616-23, 157
N.W.2d 665, 669-72 (1968) (failing to meet "the test of reasonableness that is the sine
qua non of the enforcement of rights in an action in equity"); Patel v. Ali, [1984] 1 Ch.
283, 286-88; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 & comment a (1981); J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, at 677-79; G. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 156,
at 230-31 (1954); 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1162, at 205-07; D. DOBBS, supra note 3,
at 45, 47-49, 705-06; E. FRY, supra note 4, §§ 44, 417, 652, 752; H. McCUNTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 69-74 (2d ed. 1948); J. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 40 (3d ed. 1926); 2 J. STORY, supra note 4, §§ 750, 769; W. WALSH, EQUITY
§§ 103-04 (1930); 11 S. WILUISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS §§ 1425,
1426-28 (3d ed. 1968); E. YORIO, supra note 2, ch. 4.
For an entertaining catalogue of suspicious circumstances and "presumptive sillies"
likely to appear in equitable defense cases, see Leff, supra note 4, at 531-33. Professor
Leff said that "as a rough guess . . . there are as many cases dealing with denials of
specific performance as stars in the heavens or sand by the sea." Id. at 530.

6. 19 N.J. Super. 12, 87 A.2d 770 (Ch. Div. 1952).
7. Id. at 15, 87 A.2d at 771.
8. Id. at 16, 87 A.2d at 772.
9. Id. at 15-16, 87 A.2d at 771-72.
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$12,500, but they signed without discovering their error."0 The
Rogers did nothing palpably wrong and believed the price asked
was $5500, as stated in the written agreement."' The court found
no basis to set aside the contract; at most there was a unilateral mistake by the Pancos and no concrete evidence that the Rogers were
aware of the mistake. 1 2 Nevertheless, it denied specific performance.' 3 It explained that before granting an equitable remedy, "the
court must be satisfied that the claim is fair, reasonable and equal in
all its parts."' 4 If enforcement of the contract would be "harsh, oppressive or manifestly5 unjust" to the promisor, the equitable remedy
should be withheld.'
It is difficult to describe the content of the fairness defense because the defense is very fluid. Typically, the decision to deny specific performance is based on a combination of one party's mistake
or lack of sophistication, unverified suspicions that the other was
aware of her advantage, and an unequal exchange of value.' 6 In
particular cases, one or another element may predominate; the
court may be moved by hardships that arose after the contract was
made,' the promisor's disabilities at the time of negotiation,'" the
10. Id. at 16, 87 A.2d at 772.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 17, 87 A.2d at 773. The purchase and sale agreement was drawn by the
Rogers lawyer and signed at his office. But the court found there was no "actual fraud,
undue influence or concealment" by the Rogers, and therefore no grounds for rescission. Id. at 18, 87 A.2d at 773.
13. See id. at 21, 87 A.2d at 774.
14. Id at 19-20, 87 A.2d at 773.
15. Id. at 19, 87 A.2d at 773.
16. E.g., McAllister v. Schettler, 521 A.2d 617, 623-24 (Del. Ch. 1986) (an unsophisticated seller in a weakened mental condition, an inadequate and possibly misleading
explanation of the contract, and a low price), aff'd, 547 A.2d 634 (Del. 1988); Hilton v.
Nelsen, 283 N.W.2d 877, 881-83 (Minn. 1979) (a combination of circumstances, including misunderstandings by the seller and one-sided financing terms); Schlegel v. Moorhead, 170 Mont. 341, 392-97, 552 P.2d 1009, 1010-12 (1976) (a buyer's failure to
disclose information and a low price); Panco, 19 NJ. Super. at 21, 87 A.2d at 774 (an
elderly and unsophisticated seller, a unilateral mistake about the price, a contract prepared by the buyer, and a low price); In re Estate of Mihm, 345 Pa. Super. 1, 5-10, 497
A.2d 612, 614-16 (1985) (a confidential relation between two brothers and their sister
and a low price); Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 606-13, 168 S.E.2d 82, 84-87 (1969) (an
alcoholic seller lured by the promise of a new Cadillac, and a low price); McKinnon v.
Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 613-14, 619-22, 157 N.W.2d 665, 667-68, 670-72 (1968) (a
promisor in financial straits and a low price). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 365 comment a (1979); 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1162, at 207 (usually a combination of circumstances); E. FRY, supra note 4, § 99 (same); H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5,
§ 69, at 188. Cf E. YORIO, supra note 2, § 5.4, at 105-06 (categorizing equitable defenses
but acknowledging that "the distinction in theory ... breaks down in practice").
17. E.g., Patel v. Ali, [1984] 1 Ch. 283 (enormous unforeseen personal difficulties).
18. E.g., Panco, 19 N.J. Super. at 16, 87 A.2d at 772 (unilateral mistake).
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promisee's disposition to take advantage,' 9 or the discrepancy in
values exchanged.2 °
One feature that characterizes all versions of the fairness defense is their indeterminacy. 2 ' Traditional legal defenses to contract enforcement, such as fraud, mistake, or incapacity, are
relatively well defined.22 The fairness defense is an open-ended
19. E.g., Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 168 S.E.2d 82 (1969) (enticing a drunk with a
Cadillac).
20. E.g., In re Estate of Mihm, 345 Pa. Super. 1,497 A.2d 612 (1985) (sale of stock in
a family corporation for a very low price). There is a longstanding debate on the question whether inadequate consideration, without more, is enough to support a defense to
specific performance. The two sides divide roughly into those who say a court should
not specifically enforce an unequal exchange, and those who say specific performance is
proper unless the discrepancy in value is so great as to be "conclusive evidence of
fraud." See, e.g., Seymour v. Delancey, 3 Cow. 445, 521-22 (N.Y. 1824);J. CALAMARI &J.
PERILLO, supra note 4, § 16-14, at 678; 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1165, at 22-38; W.
WALSH, supra note 5, § 104, at 1428; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 1428; E. YoRIo,
supra note 2, § 5.4.3. These two positions may not be far apart in practice, but they
differ in theory. One side proposes that courts can and should evaluate the substantive
terms of a private exchange, while the other implies that courts are not competent to
engage in substantive review and should limit their inquiry to the process by which the
agreement was reached. Compare Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L.
& ECON. 293, 305-06 (1975) (opposing substantive review) with Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1981) (in favor of substantive review).
21. When the various components of a fairness defense are disentangled and considered separately, they raise very different issues. On unanticipated hardship, see, e.g.,
Harrison, A Casefor Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573 (1983) (contract as joint enterprise); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (relative abilities of the parties to prevent or insure
against risk). On the integrity of the bargaining process, see, e.g., Dawson, Economic Dure-ss-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 282-90 (1947) (advantages gained
through unequal bargaining power as unjust enrichment); Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV. 741, 754-85 (1982) (four "norms of unconscionability"); Epstein, supra note 20, at 301-05 (opposing interference with bargaining power);
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983) [hereinafter
Kronman, Paternalism] (distortions in private choice); Sunstein, Legal Inteference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1169-73 (1986) (same). On inequality of values
exchanged, see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 20, at 305-06; Gordley, supra note 20. On nondisclosure and palpable mistake, see, e.g., Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and
the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-32 (1978) [hereinafter Kronman, Mistake] (incentives for production of information); Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and
the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982); Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of
Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 1991) (uniting information with
resources). A fairness defense, however, depends on the cumulative effect of several or
all of these factors. In this Article, I have chosen to combine them under the single
heading of fairness and address their common features rather than their differences.
22. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. Most of the standard defenses to
contract enforcement developed first in equity, as reasons why the chancellor might enjoin the promisee from prosecuting a claim in the law courts. Over time they became
defenses at law as well. See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5, § 79, at 214-15
(fraud); 2 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTrrLmON § 12.6(b), at 585-87 (1978); 3J. POME-
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standard that reaches an additional level of unfairness outside the
categories recognized at law. 23 Its lack of definition invites the
judge to respond in a more particularistic way to the facts of each
case.
The fairness defense is equitable in the sense that it applies
only to the equitable remedy of specific performance, and does not
disturb the underlying contract obligation. A promisor who establishes a defense of fraud is entitled to a decree of rescission, which
nullifies the contract. 24 In contrast, a less concrete claim of unfairsupra note 4, § 838, at 282 (mistake); W. WALSH, supra note 5, § 35, at 31 (fraud and
mistake), § 106, at 496 (fraud).
23. The unconscionability provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and the second Restatement have introduced a legal defense that resembles the equitable fairness
defense, at least according to some interpretations. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). There is no consensus on the meaning of
unconscionability under the U.C.C., and it may not reach all cases in which a court
would deny specific performance on grounds of fairness. Compare E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 328 (1990); E. YORIO, supra note 2, § 5.4.1, at 107-08; Leff, supra note
4, at 528-41; and Schwartz, The Casefor Specific Performance, 89 YALE LJ. 271, 299 (1979)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Specific Performance] (all suggesting that unconscionability in equity
is broader than unconscionability at law); with Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35-41
(1981) (unconscionability in equity can and should inform application of U.C.C. § 2302) and Newman, The Renaissance of Good Faith in Contracting in Anglo-American Law, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 553, 561 (1969) (U.C.C. § 2-302 incorporates "the equitable criterion
of fairness"). For relatively broad interpretations of unconscionability under the
U.C.C., see, e.g.,J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 9-38, at 402, § 9-40, at 406;J.
WHITE & J. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.7 (3d ed. 1988); Ellinghaus, In
Defense of Unconscionability, 78 'YALE LJ. 757 (1969). For narrower interpretations, see,
e.g., Epstein, supra note 20; Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV.
1 (1969). See also Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 748-85 (1982) (norms of unconscionability
designed to reflect failure of the justifications for full enforcement of bargains);
Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Nonsubstantive Unconscionability] (criticizing several applications of
procedural unconscionability). Further, unconscionability as a legal defense has evolved
mainly in the context of sales of goods, where it addresses a special type of problem.
Unconscionability in sales of goods is likely to be oppression on a mass scale, carried out
through printed forms, rather than advantage-taking between individuals. See Leff, supra
note 4, at 537 ("Equity dealt with the pathology of bargaining. The Code deals with the
pathology of nonbargaining.").
24. See 3 H. BLACK, RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS § 704 (2d ed. 1929); G. CLARK, supra note 5, § 278, at 408 & n.6; D. DOBBS,
supra note 3, at 254-55, 294-96, 618; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5, § 84 (fraud), § 94
(mistake); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 22, § 3.3, at 236, § 3.13, at 308-09 (fraud); 2 id.
§ 12.6(a) (mistake in assumption). When a contract is rescinded, the court's remedial
object is to restore the parties to their previous positions as if the contract had never
existed. Usually this means both parties are entitled to restitution of any benefit conferred through partial performance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 &
comment a (1981) (incapacity, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence,
breach of fiduciary relation), § 377 & comment a (impracticability, frustration); 3 H.
BLACK, supra, §§ 74, 616; G. CLARK, supra note 5, § 294, at 425; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at
ROY,
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ness ordinarily does not support rescission, although it may persuade the court to deny specific performance.2 5 When a court
follows this pattern-refusing the promisee's claim for specific performance but also refusing the promisor's claim for rescission-the
contract remains in place. As a result, the promisee can sue for
26
damages for breach, measured by the lost value of her bargain.
Equitable enforcement is barred, but a legal damage remedy is not.
The special treatment of equitable relief is highlighted by the
procedural merger of law and equity. Almost everywhere, law and
equity are now administered in a single court. When a merged
court recognizes a fairness defense to specific performance, one
judge is applying two different standards of morality, depending on

254-55; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 22, § 12.6(a), at 583-84 (mistake). On protection of the
promisee's reliance interest, see infra notes 154-159 and accompanying text.
In addition to seeking a decree of rescission, the promisor can assert her right to
rescind indirectly, by raising the fraud as a defense to a damage claim by the promisee.
See D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 255, 292-94; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 22, § 12.6(a), at 58384 (mistake). Rescission began as an equitable remedy, carried out by means of an injunction against enforcement of the contract at law. Over time the same defenses that
supported rescission in equity were recognized by the law courts. As a result the promisor could achieve the effect of a rescission decree by tendering restitution to the promisee. Once she had tendered restitution, she could defend against the promisee's
damage claim, or bring her own quasi-contract action to recover benefits conferred on
the promisee. The tender requirement is now obsolescent. For a fuller explanation, see
D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 292-96.

25. E.g., McAllister v. Schettler, 521 A.2d 617, 623 (Del. Ch. 1986), aff'd, 547 A.2d
634 (Del. 1988); Schlegel v. Moorhead, 170 Mont. 391, 394-95, 553 P.2d 1009, 1011
(1976); Panco v. Rogers, 19 NJ. Super. 12, 18, 21, 87 A.2d 770, 773, 774 (Ch. Div.
1952); Smith v. Ferguson, 622 P.2d 186, 187 (Okla. App. 1981); In re Estate of Mihm,
345 Pa. Super. 1, 3-4, 497 A.2d 612, 613 (1985);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4,
§ 16-17; G. CLARK, supra note 5, § 156, at 230-31, § 280, at 409, § 161, at 238-39, § 168,
at 247-49; 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1162, at 205, § 1164, at 219-20; H. McCUNTOCK, supra note 5, § 69, at 188-89, § 72, at 196-97; W. WALSH, supra note 5, § 103, at
477, 479, § 104 at 481; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 1425, at 827, § 1426, at 853,
§ 1427, at 857-58; E. YoRIo, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 12, § 4.5.1, at 91-93 & n.4.
26. E.g., Hilton v. Nelsen, 283 N.W.2d 877, 883-84 & n.5 (Minn. 1979); Pecorella v.
Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 1064, 1065, 486 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (1985); McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 618-19, 157 N.W.2d 665, 670 (1968); Patel v. Ali,
[1984] 1 Ch. 283, 288-89; J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 16-17; G. CLARK,
supra note 5, § 156, at 230-31, § 280, at 409; 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1164, at 22021; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 48; E. YORIO, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 12, § 4.1, at 74, § 4.2,
at 76-79, § 4.5.1, at 91-93. One empirical study suggests that in fact promisees seldom
go on to recover damages after losing on a claim for specific performance. Frank &
Endicott, Defenses in Equity and "Legal Rights", 14 LA. L. REv. 380, 381 (1954) (plaintiff
recovered damages in 2 of 150 cases surveyed). The authors attribute this pattern to the
expansion of legal defenses, limitations on the damage remedy, and plaintiffs' exhaustion. Id. at 381-83, 386-89. Their results may also reflect procedural obstacles that have
since been eliminated by liberal rules on amendment of pleadings. See id. at 384.
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the remedy sought.
This double standard is hard to understand. At least in theory,
specific performance and damages are simply two means of accomplishing the same result. Specific performance protects the plaintiff's expectation interest in a contract by delivering the promised
performance. The standard measure of damages for breach of contract protects the same interest, forcing the defendant to pay the
monetary equivalent of the promised performance.28 Why, then, do
courts apply (or claim to apply) a different standard to specific
performance?
The double standard of morality for legal and equitable contract remedies has been the subject of some scathing criticism in
scholarly writing. 29 Courts, too, seem less enthusiastic than they
27. Others have made this point. E.g., Z. CHAFEE, supra note 4, at 28.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTiRACTS § 344(a) & comment a, § 347 & comment
a (1979); J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-4; 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4,
§ 992; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 1338, at 198; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 114749. Various limits on expectancy damages are discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 160-171.
There is much literature on the expectancy measure and its justifications. Some
examples are P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAw 41-42 (1981) [hereinafter P.
ATIYAH, PROMISES] (finding no persuasive justification for an expectancy measure and
preferring to focus on reliance and unjust enrichment); P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FAU. OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACr 1-7 (1979) [hereinafter P. AiuYt, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT]
(same); C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 17-19 (1981) (expectancy damages as a corollary of a view of contract obligation in which promises derive moral force from the principle of autonomy); A. POLINsY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 31-38, 5965 (2d ed. 1989) (evaluating expectancy damages in light of three economic objectives:
efficient breach, efficient reliance, and efficient risk allocation); Cooter & Eisenberg,
Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1434, 1459-77 (1985) (defending the
expectancy measure, to the extent that it is the remedy the parties would have bargained
for under ideal conditions); Eisenberg, supra note 23 (identifying reasons of fairness and
efficiency in support of the bargain principle and situations in which those reasons falter); Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE LJ. 54, 5766 (1936) (expectancy damages as a means of protecting against and compensating reliance loss); Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89
YALE L.J. 1261, 1281-88 (1980) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, Basis of Contract] (expectancy
damages as a surrogate for an ideal net reliance remedy designed to produce an optimal
level of promissory activity); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558-78 (1977) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, Effiient Breach] (expectancy damages explained in terms of efficient breach); Wolcher, The Accommodation of
Regret in ContractRemedies, 73 IowA L. REV. 797, 804-14, 867-75, 891-92 (1988) (favoring
a mix of remedies that acknowledges the uncertainty of contractual choices).
29. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 4, at 28-32; Dawson, supra note 4, at 535-36; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1156; Newman, supra note 4, at 404-05, 426-29; Newman, supra
note 23, at 564-65; Patterson, Equitable Relief for UnilateralMistake, 28 COLUM. L. REV.
859, 899-900 (1928); Schwartz, $pecific Performance, supra note 23, at 298-303. See also
Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REv. 687, 692-93 (1990)
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once were about the special moral status of specific performance.
There are few reported decisions in recent years in which courts
have denied specific performance and also refused rescission or
granted damages.3 0 Yet courts continue to say there is a distinction
in the moral standards applicable to legal and equitable relief; opinions repeatedly assert that specific performance is discretionary and
may be withheld on the basis of unfairness that would not affect a
damage remedy. 1 The second Restatement also preserves the special
standard for equitable relief in unquestioning terms. 3 2
The purpose of this Article is to consider whether there is any
coherent explanation or justification for a morally inspired defense
that is uniquely applicable to specific enforcement of contracts. Is
there anything about the equitable remedy that calls for a stricter
standard of behavior, or a greater degree of altruism between par(concluding that stricter standards for equitable remedies are obsolete except as they
relate to functional differences between specific and substitutional relief). But cf. D.
DOBBS, supra note 3, at 48-49 (suggesting that by means of an equitable defense, courts
may be able to influence future action without upsetting existing bargains); H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5, § 69, at 189 (favoring "an intermediate zone" between specific performance and rescission); E. YORIO, supra note 2, § 4.5.2 (defending equitable defenses
because they minimize the use of coercive remedies and allow courts to reach an intermediate solution in weak cases).
30. I found six such cases dated after 1970. McAllister v. Schettler, 521 A.2d 617,
623 (Del. Ch. 1986) (land sale contract); Hilton v. Nelsen, 283 N.W.2d 877, 883-84 &
n.5 (Minn. 1979) (land sale contract); Schlegel v. Moorhead, 170 Mont. 391, 397, 553
P.2d 1009, 1011 (1976) (option to purchase a federal oil and gas lease); Pecorella v.
Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 1064, 1065, 486 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (1985) (land
sale contract); Smith v. Ferguson, 622 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (land sale
contract); Patel v. Ali, [1984] 1 Ch. 283, 288-89 (land sale contract). See also Castaldi v.
Multer, 117 A.D.2d 699, 700, 498 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (1986) (damages denied in land
sale contract for lack of proof).
It is difficult to verify current practice, however, because the cost of modern litigation makes it unlikely that cases of this type will reach the appellate level.
31. E.g., Kakalik v. Bernardo, 184 Conn. 386, 391, 439 A.2d 1016, 1020-21 (1981);
Mearida v. Murphy, 106 Ill. App. 3d 705, 709-10, 435 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (1982); Lannon v. Lamps, 80 Ill. App. 3d 318, 323-24, 399 N.E.2d 712, 716 (1980); Youngblut v.
Wilson, 294 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Iowa 1980); Baumann v. Nutter, 328 N.W.2d 354, 356
(Iowa Ct. App. 1982); Best v. Culhane, 677 S.W.2d 390, 394-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); In
re Estate of Mihm, 345 Pa. Super. 1, 4-5, 497 A.2d 612, 613-14 (1985); Amick v. Hagler,
286 S.C. 481, 484, 334 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1985); King v. Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 314, 318
S.E.2d 125, 129 (1984). SeeJ. CALAI4RI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 16-7, 17-14; E.
YORIO, supra note 2, § 4.5.1, at 91-92.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 364 (1981). Section 364(1) states
that specific performance should be denied if enforcement is unfair by reason of mistake, sharp practice, unreasonable hardship, grossly inadequate consideration, or unfair
terms. The comment adds that "the discretionary nature of equitable relief permits its
denial when a variety of factors combine to make enforcement of a promise unfair, even
though no single legal doctrine alone would make the promise unenforceable." Id. comment a.
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ties? Is there any other reason, apart from the nature of the legal
and equitable remedies, why courts preserve a distinction in the defenses available?
My analysis begins in Part I by identifying different values represented by legal and equitable standards for enforcement of contracts. Legal and equitable defenses correspond to opposing
theories of contract obligation. They also follow different formal
approaches to law.
In Part II, I consider three ways of explaining the persistence of
a dual standard. First, there are some real differences in the operation of specific and substitutional relief as a means of protecting
contract expectations." In certain situations, specific performance
and damages have different effects on the interests of third parties,
on efficiency in resource allocation, and on the distribution of
wealth between the parties. These effects, however, are not present
in all cases, and so do not justify a generally applicable fairness defense to equitable relief.
Second, courts may use the fairness defense to achieve a compromise remedy when they sense that protection of the promisee's
expectations is not appropriate.34 The compromise is possible because, although contract damages are supposed to protect the
promisee's expectations, they often fall short of this objective. In
many cases, especially those that fall within the traditional scope of
the specific performance remedy, doctrinal limits and practical difficulties of proof prevent the promisee from recovering the economic
equivalent of her bargain through a legal damage remedy. As a result, a fairness defense to specific performance tends to undermine
the expectancy measure and push the remedy toward reliance, without altogether extinguishing the promisor's liability. If this is the
function of the fairness defense, however, a more direct solution is
needed."
33. See infra subpart II(A).
34. See infra subpart II(B).
35. Professor Douglas Laycock makes a similar point in his analysis of irreparable
injury as a limit on equitable relief. Laycock, supra note 29, at 692-93, 726-28, 765-71.
His study shows that courts use the terms "irreparable injury" and "adequate remedy at
law" to accomplish a variety of particular goals that have no relation to the legal or
equitable origin of the remedy. Id. at 692. For example, courts may balance the hardship a specific remedy will impose on the defendant against the hardship the plaintiff will
suffer if the remedy is denied. But this is a comparison of costs and benefits of the two
remedies, rather than a preference for legal relief. Id. at 749-52. Laycock concludes that
the irreparable injury rule should be discarded in favor of a more direct analysis of the
functional effects of different remedies. See id. at 768-71.
My first two explanations of the fairness defense follow along similar lines. See infra

1991]

LAW AND

EquITY

IN CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT

263

A third possible explanation of the separate standards for legal
and equitable enforcement of contracts is that courts have used the
equitable fairness defense as a device to resolve a persistent conflict
between the utilitarian benefits of stability in contract law and the
impulse to impose altruist values in particular cases.3 6 The institution of private exchange requires a legal foundation with the appearance of security for future transactions. A nebulous defense to
contract liability that cannot be captured in a rule undermines that
foundation. But the utility of contract law is a function of the
message judicial decisions send to the market, rather than the decisions themselves. When the courts' power to give relief on the basis
of fairness is wrapped in the obscure form of an equitable defense,
there may be a sufficient degree of "acoustic separation ' 3 7 to preserve the appearance that contracts are reliable. In other words, the
court may be able to accomplish both goals (stability and altruism)
at once. This may in fact work quite well. But is it acceptable?
My analysis of these issues is framed against the background of
existing limitations on the scope of the specific performance remedy. Prevailing doctrine holds that specific performance is available
only when damages are inadequate (or relatively inadequate) as a
means of protecting the promisee's expectation interest. 38 Professor Douglas Laycock has demonstrated that this rule is now so di-

subparts II(A) and 1I(B). In the final subpart of the Article, however, I take a different
approach, in which I assume the fairness defense means what it says. Under that assumption, the function of a fairness defense is to make use of obscurity to accommodate
conflicting values. See infra subpart II(C).
36. See infra subpart II(C).
37. This term is taken from an article by Professor Meir Dan-Cohen, which is discussed at length infra at subpart II(C). See Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:
On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HAItv. L. REV. 625 (1984).
38. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (198 1);J. CALAMARI &J.
PERILLO, supra note 4, § 16-1; 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1139; D. DOBBS, supra note
3, at 57; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5, § 60; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 1418, at

651-53; E. YORIO, supra note 2, § 2.1, at 25, § 2.5, at 40-43.
The choice between specific performance and damages has been the subject of substantial debate. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 4.11 (3d ed. 1986);
Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 302-04 (1985);

Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); Linzer, On the Amorality of
Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 13139 (1981); MacNeil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 95053 (1982); Muris, The Cost of Freely Granting Specific Performance, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1053,
1055-58; Schwartz, Specific Performance,supra note 23, at 271; Ulen, The Effiiency of Specific
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 402
(1984); Yorio, In Defense of Money Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1387-88, 1423-24 (1982).

264

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50:253

luted that it has little practical meaning. s9 Nevertheless, equitable
defenses are not likely to arise in the context of a consumer transaction or other sale of fungible goods, because specific performance
will not be at issue.4 ° They will appear mainly in connection with
sales of land, sales of things likely to have idiosyncratic value, sales
of things for which there is no ready substitute, and long-term contractual relations. 4 ' Most cases discussed in this Article fall into the
first three of these categories, and arise from discrete exchanges negotiated on an individual basis. This Article touches only briefly on
long-term contracts, which are a separate species of transaction and
require a different type of analysis.4 2
I.

VALUES RELATE]? TO LEGAL AND EQUITABLE STANDARDS OF
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT

When the fairness defense first developed, stricter requirements for equitable relief reflected the political status of equity as an
institution. Equity was an independent judicial system. At least in
theory, it was subsidiary and supplemental to the law courts, and
acted only when justice cried out for a solution that was not avail39. See Laycock, supra note 29. Laycock's article is a comprehensive survey and analysis of the present status of the irreparable injury rule and its counterpart, the adequacyof-legal-remedies test, as limits on equitable relief. He concludes that courts do not
prefer legal remedies to equitable remedies, as such. See id. at 691-93, 701-03. At most
they may favor a damage remedy in the case of fungible goods traded in an orderly
market when damages and specific performance are interchangeable, and even then
their choice of damages reflects a preference for impersonal judgments rather than personal commands. Id. at 695-97. In other cases, judicial references to irreparable injury
or adequacy of legal remedies disguise different "operative rules," such as a balance of
costs and benefits, or a substantive policy that favors a less effective remedy. Id. at 76566.
For another interesting discussion of the adequacy test, see Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisitefor an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 358 (1981)
(adequacy of legal remedies masks judgments about the importance of different legal
interests).
40. Although he dismisses the adequacy requirement, Laycock agrees that damages
are the prevailing remedy in cases involving fungible goods, primarily because the plaintiff is unlikely to pursue specific performance. See Laycock, supra note 29, at 723-24.
41. For surveys of the circumstances in which courts have found the remedy at law
inadequate and granted specific performance, seeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4,
§§ 16-2 to 16-3; 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4, §§ 1142-1158; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at
58-59; H. McCLINTOCK, supra note 5, § 60, at 150-52, 154-58; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra
note 5, §§ 1418A, 1419-1419B; Laycock, supra note 22, at 703-14. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 359 (1981).
42. See I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 10-35, 72-77 (1980); Goetz & Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981) .
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able within the procedural strictures of law.4" Further, early chancellors often were ecclesiastics.4 4 Thus, it was natural that equity
should expect the plaintiff to present a morally appealing case for
relief, and should deny relief if the court detected unfairness in the
transaction. 4 5 Law, on the other hand, was a highly formal system.
It was concerned with maintaining order and restraining arbitrary
power, and it preferred fixed rules of conduct over vague notions of
fairness.4 6
Political considerations between competing tribunals no longer
affect decisions to grant equitable relief.47 Equity is simply a body
of substantive and remedial law historically tied to the chancellors'
separate courts. But the different approaches to contract enforcement that developed historically in law and equity correlate with
competing values in modem law.
A.

Legal Defenses

The traditional model of contract enforcement at law holds the
promisor liable for the value of the promisee's bargain, subject only
to a set of standardized defenses. Legal defenses to contract enforcement include fraud,4 8 variations on fraud,4 9 certain types of
43. G. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO Eourry 22 (6th ed. 1965); F. MArrILAND, EQurrY
4-6 (2d ed. 1920); T. PLucKNrr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 688-89 (5th
ed. 1956); 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 4, § 50, at 64-65. For an example of how law and
equity interacted in the fifteenth century, see J.R. v. M.P., Y.B. 37 Hen. VI 13, p1.3
(1459).
44. G. KEETON, supra note 43, at 12; F. MArnANv, supra note 43, at 2-3; T.
PLUCKNETr, supra note 43, at 685. Ecclesiastics predominated until the sixteenth century. F. MATID, supra note 43, at 8-9; T. PLUCKNErr, supra note 43, at 688.
45. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 43, at 8-9; T. PLucKNETr, supra note 43, at 685-86; 1
J. POMEROY, supra note 4, §§ 46, 48-50, 62-65.

46. On the rigidity of the common law, dating from the fourteenth century, see T.
PLucKNETT, supra note 43, at 680-81; 1J. POMEROY, supra note 4, §§ 16-17, at 20-24. The
influence of hostility to official prerogative is discussed in T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 43,
at 48-51, 191-95; Rundell, The Chancellor'sFoot: The Nature of Equity, 27 U. KAN. CITY L.
REV. 71, 71-75 (1958).
47. The procedural merger of law and equity courts is discussed briefly in D. DOBBS,
supra note 3, at 65-68, 81-82.

48. True fraud is knowing misrepresentation, intended to mislead. RESTATEMENT
162(1) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 471 (1932). See
J. CALAMAI
&J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 9-13; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.12, at
257; 12 S. WILUSTON, supra note 5, § 1487, at 326-27.
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

49. These include innocent misrepresentation, concealment, and nondisclosure in

certain cases.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § §

159-161 (1981);

RESTATEMENT

OF CONTRACTS §§ 471-472 (1932);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 9-14, 9-20;
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.11, at 250-57; 12 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5,

§§ 1497-99, 1500. The second Restatement expanded the defense of nondisclosure to
cover cases in which the promisee knows the promisor is making a basic mistake, and her
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mistake,5 ° incapacity,5 1 duress,5 2 impossibility, 5 3 and undue influence.' In contrast to the equitable fairness defense, these defenses
silence violates a standard of "fair dealing."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 161(b) (1981). See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.11, at 255-56 (criticizing the
mistake-in-basic-assumption defense as overly broad). An indeterminate standard of
conduct such as fair dealing is a move away from the traditional model, in the direction
of the equitable standard of fairness.
50. The defense of mistake in assumption was once limited to cases of mutual mistake, or cases in which one party was mistaken and the other was aware of the mistake
but said nothing. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 502, 505 (1932). SeeJ. CAsiLzI &J.
PERILLO, supra note 4, § 9-26, at 379; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 9.3, at 684, § 9.4,
at 698; 13 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 1543, at 73-78, § 1573, at 486.
The second Restatement expanded the defense to cover a broader range of unilateral
mistake, if enforcement of the resulting contract would be "unconscionable." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153(a) (1981). SeeJ. CA.A.MA.RI &J. PERILLO, supra
note 4, § 9-27, at 386-88; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 9.4, at 696; 13 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 5, § 1573, at 488-90. Like the second Restatement's nondisclosure standard,
this is a move in the direction of the equitable fairness defense. See supra note 49.
51. The threshold requirement of capacity to contract is a low one. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12-15 (198 1);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4,
99 8-10; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 227-28.
52. The traditional definition of duress is coercion or threat that undermines the
promisor's will. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1) (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 9-2, at 33637; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.16, at 272-73; Dawson, supra note 21, at 256.
There is a tendency in modern doctrine to shift the focus of duress from destruction of
the promisor's will to unjust enrichment. In other words, the unfairness of the result
may bear on the propriety of the pressure used to obtain it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (198 1);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 9-2, at 338; E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.17, at 277-78; Dawson, supra note 21, at 282-90. Again,
incorporation of an indeterminate standard such as unjust enrichment brings the defense closer in character to the fairness defense. See supra notes 49-50.
53. The doctrine of impossibility excuses performance when unforeseen difficulties
make further performance impracticable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 261 (1981);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 13-1; 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 4,
§§ 1320, 1325; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, §§ 9.5-9.6; 18 S. WIUISTON, supra note 5,
§ 1935. The related doctrine of frustration of purpose provides an excuse when the
purpose of the contract is undermined by unforeseen events. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 265 (1981);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 13-12; 6 A. CORBIN,
supra note 4, § 1320, 1353; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 9.7; 18 S. WILLISTON, supra
note 5, § 1935, at 23-25. The scope of these excuses has expanded somewhat, but they
remain devices for allocating risk in circumstances not covered by the parties' agreement. They are not intended to overrule agreed allocations of risk. See E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 23, § 9.6, at 707; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 21, at 98.
54. The defense of undue influence permits rescission of a contract obtained
through unfair persuasion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981); J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 9-9; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.20. Unfair persuasion is a broad standard, but the defense normally is limited to confidential
relations, marked by dominance and trust. See RESTATEMENT, supra § 177 & comment a;
J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 9-11; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.20, at
285-86. Further, courts have standardized their application of the undue influence defense by employing an elaborate set of presumptions. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra
note 4, § 9-10.
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are relatively narrow and concrete. Further, they focus on the process of agreement, or on filling gaps in the agreement, rather than
on the substantive exchange.55 They do not excuse the promisor
from liability simply because she lacked business acumen and made
a bad bargain.
The Uniform Commercial Code and the second Restatement of
Contracts have altered this picture by adding the defense of uncon56
scionability and expanding the definitions of some other defenses.
But the scope of unconscionability as a legal defense is still in doubt,
and commentators have tried hard to contain and delimit it.5 7 In
the present discussion, the "legal" model of enforcement refers to
the more traditional legal defenses as they stood before unconscionability. In the end, I will return briefly to unconscionability as a
generally applicable defense.
The traditional legal model of enforcement fits well with several
ideas about the purpose and justification of contract law. One of
these is a utilitarian view that conceives a credit economy as an important source of welfare in our society and contract law as a means
of fostering that economy. This view derives from the social interest
in "security of transactions":5 law should encourage promissory
exchange by making promises reliable.5 9 The policy in favor of
55. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 4.1 (courts have been reluctant to police the
substance of private bargains, focusing instead on the status and behavior of the parties). See also Epstein, supra note 20, at 293-301 (describing a strictly process-oriented
approach). The fraud, incapacity, and mistake-in-assmption defenses address defects
in the bargaining process. Frustration and impossibility allocate risks not adequately
covered by the contract. To some extent, duress and undue influence involve a review
of substantive fairness, but only as it bears on the behavior of the promisee. See J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 9-2, at 338 (duress), § 9-10, at 352 (undue influence); Dawson, supra note 21, at 282-90 (duress).
56. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) (unconscionability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153(a) (mistake), § 161(b) (nondisclosure), § 176(2) (duress), § 208 (unconscionability) (1981). See supra notes 15, 49-50.
57. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 20, at 305-14; Leff, supra note 4, at 488; Murray, supra
note 23, at 14; Schwartz, Nonsubstantive Unconscionability,supra note 23, at 1054. One way
to contain unconscionability and make it more rule-like is to confine it to "procedural"
unconscionability, which means unfairness in the bargaining process rather than substantive unfairness in the exchange. See Leff, supra note 4, at 487-89 (author of the distinction); Epstein, supra note 20, at 294-95; Schwartz, Nonsubstantive Unconscionability,
supra note 23, at 1054.
Not all writers have taken such a narrow view; some are willing to carry unconscionability to its full semantic potential. E.g:, Ellinghaus, supra note 21, at 758; J. WHITE &
J. SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 4.7.
58. This term comes from R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

134 (1954).
59. This is a widely recognized value, shared by writers who might differ in the
weight they would accord to a flourishing credit economy, relative to other goals. See,
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commercial stability is served by legal rules that ensure the enforcement of bargains within predictable limits. 6°
The importance of reliable enforcement rules to the system of
promissory exchange has been challenged. Some writers doubt the
impact of legal rules on private activity. 6 ' Further, Professor Louis
Wolcher has argued that a certain degree of protection against regretted decisions is necessary to encourage risk-averse parties to engage in promissory transactions.6 2 If so, the credit system is best
served when the law strikes a balance between security and excuse.
In general, however, the utility of the market is closely associated
with certainty and reliability in law.
The legal model of enforcement also corresponds to economic
analysis, which looks at contract law in terms of wealth maximization. Economic analysis is related to the utilitarian ideas described
above, but is narrower in its vision of the function of law. It assumes
that the object (or one object) of private law is to encourage efficiency in individual affairs so as to maximize social wealth. 63 In the
area of contract law, economic analysis is based on the two related
premises that the only meaningful measure of value is what people
are willing to pay and that private exchange between rational actors
64
will increase wealth by moving resources to their highest value.
There is room in this approach for defenses to contract enforcee.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § § 1.2-1.3; R. POUND, supra note 58, at 133-34; Eisen-

berg, supra note 21, at 744; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 62-63; McClintock, Mistake
and the ContractualInterests, 28 MINN. L. REV. 460, 463 (1944) (counterposed to individual
will); Patterson, supra note 29, at 883; Wolcher, supra note 28, at 798, 865-67.
60. Professor Fuller's article on contract interests explains the relation between protecting reliance on contracts and full enforcement of the promisee's bargain. See Fuller
& Perdue, supra note 28. If losses incurred in reliance on a broken contract (including
opportunity cost) were readily measurable, compensation for reliance loss would protect
the institution of contract. In fact, the effect of reliance is difficult to calculate; therefore
an expectancy remedy is necessary to assure commercial actors that they are safe in
relying on a promise. Id. at 61-62. But cf.Wolcher, supra note 28, at 865-67 (suggesting
that relief from obligation is sometimes necessary to foster promissory activity).
61. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Htv. L. REV.
1685, 1698-1700 (1976) (adding that when some know the rules and some do not, formal rules "intensify the disparity in bargaining power"); Macaulay, An Empirical View of
Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 467-68. See also M. KELmAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 43 (1987) (legal uncertainty has no substantial legal effect on contracting
parties who may insure against it).

62. See Wolcher, supra note 28, at 865-92.
63. See generally R. POSNER, supra note 38, §§ 2-2.3, 8.1-8.3.
64. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-3 (1979); R.
POSNER, supra note 38, §§ 1.1-1.2, at 5-13; A. POLINSKY, supra note 28, at 10. There are
several definitions of efficiency. A transaction is Pareto efficient if it benefits at least one
person, and leaves no one worse off. A transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it in-
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ment, but only when enforcement produces inefficiencies that ne65
gate or outweigh the benefits of exchange.
Economic analysis tends to favor the narrowest versions of existing legal defenses, and its adherents do not like vague equitable
defenses based on hardship and unfairness.' A potential defense
based on a judge's intuition of unfairness undermines rational calculation of costs and benefits. 6 7 Moreover, the fairness defense
often rests at least in part on an unequal exchange of value. Judicial
inquiry into the adequacy of values exchanged is inconsistent with
economic theory because it violates the principle that value is subjective and best left to the judgment of the parties.'
Traditional legal defenses also comport with moral theories
that value autonomy and view the process of contracting as an exercise of individual freedom. Professor Charles Fried, for example,
argues that the institution of contract allows individuals to pursue
creases aggregate wealth, even if someone suffers a loss of value. R. POSNER, supra note
38, § 1.2, at 12-13.
Economic analysis assumes that private exchange is efficient because rational actors
would not agree to a trade unless each predicted a benefit to herself. See, e.g., A.
KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra, at 1-2. But this assumption is accurate only in the KaldorHicks sense, because contracts have'external effects. When A sells a good to B, B's use
of the good may cause harm to a third party, C, that A's use did not. And if another
party, D, was competing with B for A's good, D loses a potential benefit. Thus there is
no assurance that the exchange between A and B is Pareto efficient. Wonnell, Contract
Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 54 FoRDHAm L. REv. 507, 511-12 (1986). On the
other hand, if everyone is informed and rational and the transaction takes place against a
background of efficiency-based tort rules, it should be Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
65. Defenses to contract enforcement have several functions in economic analysis.
Lack of information and other distortions in the bargaining process are costly because
they undermine the assumption of mutually beneficial exchange. A sanction of nonenforcement can be used to minimize those costs and create incentives for efficient behavior in contract negotiation. For example, a defense based on mistake can be efficient if
the promisee was in a better position than the promisor to prevent the mistake. See R.
POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.4; Kronman, Mistake, supra note 21, at 2-8. Judge Posner also
approves limited defenses based on fraud and duress, in order to deter conduct that
otherwise would elicit costly protective responses. See R. POSNER, supra note 38, §§ 4.64.7. A defense to enforcement also may serve as an efficient default rule to fill gaps in
the parties' agreement. For example, when unanticipated difficulties arise in performance, a defense of impossibility can be efficient if the promisee is the party better able to

avoid or insure against the risk. R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.5; Posner & Rosenfield,
supra note 21, at 88-92.
66. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.7, at 104 ("Economic analysis reveals no
grounds other than fraud, incapacity, and duress (the last narrowly defined) for allowing
a party to repudiate the bargain .... "); Schwartz, Specific Performance, supra note 23, at
298-303; Ulen, supra note 38, at 396-97 & n.181.
67. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 20.3 (costs imposed by the choice of standards
over rules).
68. See Ulen, supra note 38, at 396 n.181.
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their ends more fully through mutual trust and cooperation.6 9 Contract obligations between parties are morally charged because they
represent the promisor's voluntary invocation of a convention (con70
tract law and custom) that serves autonomy by promoting trust.
From this perspective, breach of an obligation freely undertaken is
an intrusion on the rights of the promisee. 7 1
Professor Randy Barnett's consent theory of contract obligation
rests on similar moral foundations.72 Barnett sees contract law as
one component of a legal order based on individual rights. 7 ,
Rights, in his view, mark the boundaries of individual discretion, in
order to "facilitat[e] freedom of human action and interaction" in
society. 74 Within this system, contract law governs the transfer of
rights, and derives its moral force from the promisor's manifestation
of consent to a binding transfer. 75 Enforcement of contracts on the
basis of manifested consent protects the autonomy of both promisor
(her expressed will) and promisee (her interest in planning).7 6
Contract theories founded on autonomy admit defenses to contract obligation if the decision to contract was not voluntary.
Promises induced by fraud or mistake, for example, are not autonomous expressions and have no moral force. 7 7 Of course, the notion
69. See C. FRIED, supra note 28, at ,1-17.
70. Id.
71. Id. The ideal of individual autonomy also inspired the "will" theory of contract
in earlier literature. See P. ArryAH, PROMISES, supra note 28, at 13-22; P. ATrrAH, FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr, supra note 28, at 405-08; C. FRIED, supra note 28, at 2; R. POUND,
supra note 58, at 151-52. Many writers have acknowledged the place of autonomy in
contract theory, although not all give it the same weight. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 21,
at 287-88; Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 746-47; Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 21, at
780-98; Linzer, supra note 38, at 112-13; McClintock, supra note 59, at 463; Radin, ContractObligation and the Human Will, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 575 (1943). See also Kennedy, supra
note 61, at 1718 (identifying the "polar opposites" of individualism and altruism in contract law).
72. See Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
73. See id. at 295.
74. See id. at 297. For a general outline of Barnett's system of rights, see id. at 29195.
75. Id. at 296-300. Professor Barnett distinguishes his theory from Professor Fried's,
primarily on the ground that his standard of consent is an objective one. Consent, to
Barnett, means words or conduct that signal consent according to common understanding. See id. at 300-07.
76. Id. at 306-09.
77. Professor Fried describes the defense of fraud as a necessary corollary of his
moral theory of contract obligation, because fraud violates the principles of respect and
trust on which the obligation rests. C. FRIED, supra note 28, at 77-79. He approaches
mistake differently, treating it as a problem outside the scope of his theory. Mistakes are
gaps in agreement; therefore they are not governed by the promise theory and must be
resolved by reference to other principles. Id. at 58-63, 69-73. Some of the principles he
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of "voluntary agreement" is susceptible to more than one interpretation. One question is whether an autonomy-based theory of obligation requires inquiry into the subjective will of the promisor.78
Another is how cognitive and informational defects affect autonomy
and the integrity of private choice. To the extent that choices are
distorted in this way, some forms of paternalistic intervention in private exchange may serve to protect rather than inhibit the personal
autonomy of the parties.7 9
In general, however, autonomy as a value in contract law is better served by the legal model of enforcement than by the equitable
model. Contract as a vehicle for autonomy requires a convention
the parties can understand, and a defense based on general unfairness muddles that convention. 8 0 Further, at least the more traditional views of contractual autonomy hold that judicial relief against
bad judgment or lack of sophistication denies the promisor the respect and equality required by liberal philosophy. 8 '
suggests-particularly a principle of loss sharing--could lead to a broad standard of
relief similar to the fairness defense. A highly indeterminate standard, however, seems
inconsistent with Fried's concept of contract law as a convention that enhances autonomy by facilitating mutual trust. See id. at 7-17, 84-85. See also id. at 93-99, 103-09 (rejecting defenses based on unequal bargaining power or the promisor's need).
Professor Barnett characterizes defenses to contract obligation as circumstances
that rebut the prima facie case established by a manifestation of consent. Barnett, supra
note 72, at 318-19. In his words, consent can lose its "normal, presumed significance"
as a result of improper inducement, lack of capacity, or gaps in the agreement. Id. at
318. But this does not quite tell us what to do with a promisor who, due to her own
mistake, meant to signal assent to something other than what she got.
Cf. Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice, 89 YALE LJ. 472, 475-98 (1980)
(critique of libertarian positions).
78. See P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, supra note 28, at 13-14; C. FRIED, supra note 28, at 6162; Barnett, supra note 72, at 300-07. One problem with the will theory of contract
obligation is that it indicates a subjective standard of obligation, which impairs the reliability of the contract convention and reduces the opportunity for self-fulfillment that
contract law is supposed to provide. See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 106, at 477. For an
attempt to harmonize, see Barnett, supra note 72, at 272-74, 319-20.
79. See Kronman, Paternalism,supra note 21, at 765, 774-98; Sunstein, supra note 21.
See also Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 769, 769-72 (1979) (challenging
assumptions about consumer choice). Professor Sunstein resists the term "paternalism." See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1138. Professor Kronman uses the term but differentiates among forms of paternalism. See Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 21, at 765.

80. See C.

FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES:

PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL

CHOICE 121-23 (1970) (importance of form to liberty).
81. See C. FRIED, supra note 28, at 103-04; Epstein, supra note 20, at 304-05. Professor Kronman distinguishes between simple disappointment (failed predictions) and "regret," which occurs when the promisor's personal goals have changed in a way that
reduces the value of the exchange in her eyes. See Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 28,
at 780-81. He suggests that relief against this type of regret is consistent with autonomy,
under a view of autonomy that recognizes the moral progress of the individual. See id.
But he does not advocate relief against simple disappointment. See id.
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In sum, at least three of the values that influence contract law
point toward the legal model of enforcement: the social utility of a
market economy, efficient resource allocation, and respect for personal autonomy. In part, the relation is substantive-for varying
reasons, each of these values is served by enforcement of bargains,
and the legal model enforces more bargains.
Apart from their substantive implications, these three approaches to contract have in common a preference for the formal
medium of rules, as opposed to standards. Law in the form of a rule
directs the judge to respond in a certain way to certain facts. It applies without regard to context, except as context is built into the
rule. It implements a background policy that applies to most of the
cases it governs by dictating the outcome of all cases it governs and
by preempting further normative evaluation.8 2 Its opposite is a
standard, which refers directly to a norm and directs the judge to
apply that norm to whatever facts may come before the court.8 3
Rules have the advantages of certainty of outcome and restraint on
judicial discretion, at the expense of accuracy in particular decisions.' Standards allow the judge to observe and tailor the result
82. For discussions of the nature of a "rule," see Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974); Kennedy, supra note 61, at
1687; Powers, StructuralAspects of the Impact of Law on Moral Duty Within Utilitarianismand
Social Contract Theory, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1268 (1979); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE
LJ. 509, 510, 539-55 (1988); Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 384-85
(1985). A rule can be described in terms of its operation: it defines a set of ascertainable circumstances, and dictates a particular result whenever those circumstances are
present. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1687-88; Schlag, supra, at 382-83. Or it can be
described in terms of its effect on the decisionmaking process: a rule limits the field of
inquiry and'screens out considerations the decisionmaker might find relevant if she were
selecting an outcome in the absence of a rule. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra, at 266-67;
Powers, supra, at 1277-78; Schauer, supra, at 520-23. One characteristic implicit in both
descriptions is neutrality of terms. To operate as a rule--effectively screening some
considerations from the decision-the directive must be free of words that act as normative prisms. See Schauer, supra, at 511-20 (distinguishing between formalism in the sense
of avoiding or disguising choice and formalism in the sense of following a rule that
withdraws choice). See alsoJ. RA , THE AuTrHoRrry oF LAw 37-52 (1979) (sources thesis).

Professor Schauer's article on formalism is addressed in part to the question
whether rules can constrain decisions. Schauer, supra, at 520-32. He argues persuasively that they can: decision according to rule is possible both conceptually (words
have a contextual meaning) and psychologically. See id.
83. For descriptions of the nature of a standard, see Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 82,
at 258; Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1688; Schlag, supra note 82, at 382-83. Most laws are
not perfect rules or standards; they fall along an intermediate continuum. Further, the
continuum of rules to standards is not the only continuum along which forms of law can
be ranged. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 82, at 259 (rules and discretion); Kennedy,
supra note 61, at 1689-90 (generality and specificity).
84. Some pros and cons are set out in Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1695-1701; Posner
& Ehrlich, supra note 82, at 261-71; Schauer, supra note 82, at 539- 42; Schlag, supra note

1991]

LAw AND EqurrY IN CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT

273

to the needs of the case, at the expense of stability and predictability."5 In the area of contract defenses, the equitable fairness defense
takes the form of a standard. Legal defenses (with the exception of
unconscionability) are closer in form to rules.
The first two views of contract-those concerned with the social
function of the market or economic efficiency-favor rules over
standards because they are prospective in focus. Both are interested
in the effect that legal decisions will have on future conduct, either
by reassuring the market that promises are reliable, or by eliciting
efficient responses from parties who act in the shadow of law. To
achieve these goals, the message of the decision must be clear and
stable. The third theory-based on the personal autonomy of contracting parties-is not directly oriented to future conduct, but it
requires rules because predictable results are a precondition for autonomous choice.
B.

Equity: The Fairness Defense

The values that drive equitable defenses are values of fairness
and justice between parties. Dean Robert Stevens found in equity
"a more particularized justice" that relieves against individual hardship.8 6 Professor Ralph Newman, another advocate of equitable
principles, called equity "the force by which law becomes humanized."8 7 Equity represents "ideal justice," "standards of decent and
honorable conduct," "human brotherhood, '8 8 and "the duty to
share the burdens of unanticipated misfortune."8 9 Phrases of this
kind may seem out of place in the current contract scholarship. But
they express the basic idea of the fairness defense, that one party
should not be allowed to profit from a bargain that resulted from
the other's error or lack of sophistication and imposes considerable
hardship on the promisor.
Another way to look at equitable defenses is to fit them into
Professor Duncan Kennedy's dialectic conception of contract law.
In Kennedy's cosmography, contract law is subject to polar forces of
82, at 384-89. For a detailed account of the utilitarian benefits and costs of obedience to
legal rules, see Powers, supra note 82, at 1270-93.
85. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1695-1701; Schlag, supra note 82, at 384-89.
86. Stevens, A Pleafor the Extension of Equitable Principles and Remedies, 41 CORNELL L.
REV. 351, 353 (1956). See also R. POUND, supra note 58, at 62-65 (equity as a device for
"individualizing the application of law").
87. Newman, supra note 4, at 405.
88. Id. at 408.
89. Id. at 411. Newman also equated equity with the "principle of individualization
ofjustice." Id. at 413-14.
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individualism and altruism.9 The fairness defense is an expression
of altruism, because it requires individuals to share wealth and sacrifice self-interest for others who are less astute bargainers. 9 '
Equitable defenses to contract enforcement also are consistent
with Aristotle's definition of equity as a correction of gaps and inaccuracies that result from the application of general rules to particular cases. 9 2 The fairness defense performs this function well
because it takes the form of a standard. It permits the judge to take
account of deserving cases that fall through the cracks of legal
defenses.
For similar reasons, the ideal of corrective justice may belong in
the equity column. 93 At least one author, Professor James Gordley,
has proposed that the principle of corrective justice supports judicial relief against unequal exchange. 94 In Gordley's view, any exmarket value is an unjust enrichment, which
change for less than
95
should be rectified.
90. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1713-78. Kennedy's vision is interesting, but I am
not persuaded that antitheses of individualism and altruism provide an accurate and
complete picture of law. I prefer to view individualism and altruism as values that are
sometimes but not always in conflict. For example, it is possible to support an individualist legal regime on grounds of social utility, which is in some ways an altruistic value.
91. Id. at 1717-18. The fairness defense also fits Kennedy's description of the relation between substance and form. Throughout his article, Kennedy traces connections
between individualism and the use of rules, and between altruism and the use of standards. But cf. Schlag, supra note 82, at 420 (arguing that there is no consistent relation
between altruist values and the use of standards).
92. Aristotle described equity as "a correction of law where it is defective owing to
its universality." ARISTOTLE, NiCOMACHEAN ETHics bk. V, ch. 10, *1 137b.
93. The term corrective justice refers to Aristotle's discussion ofjustice in book V of
the Nicomachean Ethics. ARISTOTLE, supra note 92, book V, ch. 4 at * 1132. For a sample of different conceptions of corrective justice, see Coleman, Corrective Justice and
Wrongful Gain, I IJ. LEGAL STUD. 421, 423-28 (1982) (rectification based on fault or taking); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973) (liability
based on causation); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,
540-42 (1972) (reciprocity); Nickel,Justice in Compensation, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379,
387-88 (1976) (protection of just holdings); Posner, The Concept of CorrectiveJustice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 201-06 (1981) (wealth maximization);
Schroeder, CorrectiveJustice and Liabilityfor IncreasingRisks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 451-69
(1990) (liability based on personal responsibility, ex ante; compensation based on harm
caused, ex post); Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 113 (1990) (a reply to Schroeder).
94. See Gordley, supra note 20.
95. See id. at 1588-1625. The fairness defense usually rests on a combination of circumstances, including defects in the bargaining process as well as inequality in the values exchanged. See supra notes 16-20, and accompanying text. Gordley's argument goes
further, because it treats an unequal result as unjust in itself without regard to the contract process. See Gordley, supra note 20, at 1636-37. At the same time, he softens the
impact of substantive review by tying it to a standard of market price. See id. at 1609-17.
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At the substantive level, the connection between corrective justice and equitable defenses is imperfect because it depends on the
contestable assumption that it is wrong to enforce a hard bargain.
Corrective justice (in my view) is purely a remedial principle that
requires correction of wrongful gain and loss. 96 It does not say
when gains are wrongful and when they are not; therefore it cannot
justify a substantive standard of contract enforcement without the
assistance of some other norm.9 7
At the formal level, however, there is a stronger connection.
To the extent that corrective justice implies the most perfect remedial justice possible between parties, it is better served by a standard
of fairness than by more determinate legal defenses. Legal defenses
are designed for clarity and accessibility at the time the contract is
formed. The fairness defense is a more effective tool for corrective
justice because it allows the judge to respond directly to the situation before the court, after a breach has occurred. Its object is not
to regulate future conduct in a range of similar cases, but to undo an
unjust result between parties.9 8
Finally, the fairness defense can be identified, for better or
worse, with paternalism. Stated favorably, a fairness defense allows
the judge to identify cognitive defects or gaps in information that
distorted the promisor's decision to enter into the contract, and to
give relief against subsequent regret. 99 Stated less sympathetically,
96. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 92, bk. V, ch. 4, at *1132.
97. A number of tort theorists have tried to show that corrective justice is on their
side. See supra note 93. If anything, their varying interpretations show that corrective
justice cannot carry a substantive burden. See Alexander, Causation and CorrectiveJustice:
Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 LAw & PHIL. 1, 7-11 (1987) (entitlement theories cannot be
tied to corrective justice without independent normative justification); Posner, supra
note 93, at 190, 201-03 (separating the "procedural" principle of corrective justice from
the substantive definition of wrongdoing).
98. Aristotle's description of corrective justice suggests an individualized process of
adjustment between parties. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 92, bk. V, ch. 4, at * 132a. See
also Alexander, supra note 97, at 12, 16 (corrective justice as a "backward-looking" process, equated with current tort law); Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability,Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV.
1001, 1064 (1988) (justice "based on individual autonomy and individual responsibility").
This interpretation is not universal. Judge Posner, for example, believes that corrective justice can be achieved in the aggregate by imposing costs on a pool of potential
wrongdoers. Posner, supra note 93, at 198-99, 202-03. But see Coleman, supra note 93, at
425 n.10 (deterrence is not rectification). Cf. Schroeder, supra note 93, at 448-49 (on
the liability side, responsibility should be determined ex ante). If Posner is correct, corrective justice has very little content. To me, if corrective justice means anything, it
means that one aspect of justice is rectification on an individual basis.
99. See Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 21; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1171.

276

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50:253

a fairness defense allows the judge to question the competence of
the promisor's expressed choice on an individual basis. Further,
this individualized form of intervention may pose a greater threat to
autonomy than paternalistic regulation of standardized transactions
based on general conclusions about a group of promisors.' 0 0
Distilling this, the equitable model of enforcement, which
grants relief from contract obligations on the basis of unfairness in
the process and substantive content of a bargain, exercises compassion at the expense of utility and stability. It imposes ethics of community and sharing, in opposition to individualism. It is designed to
accomplish individual justice retrospectively rather than to channel
prospective conduct. And it operates by means of standards rather
than rules.
II.

WHY IS THERE A DOUBLE STANDARD?

The effect of disparate legal and equitable contract defenses is
that two contract remedies, damages and specific performance, are
held to different standards. But the fact that different values are
served by each set of defenses does not ekplain why courts differentiate between two remedies that are both supposed to protect the
promisee's expectations. The remainder of this Article outlines
three possible answers. In the first two subparts, I will set aside the
conflict in substantive values and consider whether the different defenses can be explained in remedial terms, according to differences
in the operation of the two remedies. In the third subpart, I will
return to the substantive and formal implications of legal and equitable defenses and discuss the role of equitable defenses as a means
of reconciling opposing values in contract law.
A. Specific and Substitutional Relief
Both damages and specific performance are designed to give
the promisee the benefit of the bargain. 0 ' But there are differences
100. Kronman's analysis of paternalism is concerned mainly with rules that invalidate
certain types of agreement based on the cognitive or informational disadvantages of the
classes of actors most likely to enter into them. Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 21.
Paternalistic judgments on an individual basis are more directly intrusive, because they
are personalized. On the other hand, the decision to grant an equitable defense in a
particular case on paternalistic grounds applies only to the promisor who regrets her
choice, and does not disable all like actors from transacting business. See Dawson, supra
note 21, at 264; Epstein, supra note 20, at 304-05.
101. Specific performance delivers the bargain in kind, by injunction. At least in theory, the standard measure of damages delivers the value of the bargain in money. For
material on the expectancy measure of damages, see supra note 28.
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between the two remedies that may justify a special defense to specific relief in some cases. One difference is the form of the remedy:
specific performance gives the promisee her bargain in kind, while
damages provide a money substitute.
This subpart of the Article is concerned with the different effects of specific and substitutional relief. In practice, a damage remedy may also differ from specific performance because it does not
give the promisee the full value of the bargain, but that problem is
postponed to the next subpart.' 0 2 In order to isolate the consequences of specific relief, this subpart assumes that the damage remedy is equivalent to the value of performance.' 0 3
There are reasons for special defenses to specific relief, but they
are quite narrow. They do not explain a generally higher standard
of fairness for specific performance.
1. External Effects of Specific Relief.-The simplest case for a distinction between enforcement of a contract by specific performance
and enforcement by damages is when physical performance has negative effects on third parties or the public. "o For example, suppose
a buyer and seller enter into a land-sale contract; then the seller
conveys the land to a third party who moves in and makes improvements. Specific performance imposes substantial hardship on the
third party, but a damage remedy does not affect her. 0 5 Or suppose a school system purchases land and builds a school knowing
that a gas station holds an option to purchase a corner of the parcel.
There are no equities on the side of the school system, but specific
102. See infra subpart II(B).
103. This assumption can never be completely accurate because costs of litigation are
not compensated in our system. See Farber, Reassessing the Economic Effciency of Compensatory Damagesfor Breach of Contract,66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1450-51 (1980). Litigation costs,
however, are not a significant point in the comparison between specific performance and
damages because they affect both remedies. For a discussion of other ways in which the
assumption of full compensation breaks down and the value of the two remedies begins
to diverge, see infra text accompanying notes 161-172.
104. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 364(b) (1981); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 4, § 16-13, at 676; 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1169; H. McCUNTOCK, supra note 5, § 70, at 193-94; E. YoRIo, supra note 2, § 5.6, at 114.
105. This example assumes the third party had only constructive notice of the prior
contract, and made improvements in good faith. One case along these lines is Kelly v.
Central Pac. R.R. Co., 74 Cal. 557, 16 P. 386 (1888). A railroad had offered land for sale
at low prices to occupants, in order to encourage settlement along a railway. Kelly misrepresented that he was an occupant and purchased land. Meanwhile, the real occupant
made improvements on the land. The court denied Kelly's claim to specific performance, in part because of the hardship it would have imposed on the third-party occupant.
See id. at 561, 16 P. at 388.
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performance would
result in danger and inconvenience to
6
schoolchildren.
The fairness defense is broad enough to take these considerations into account; in the school case, for example, the court denied
specific performance and limited the gas station's remedy to damages.' 0 7 And the result is sound, at least when expectancy damages
provide equivalent value to the promisee.' °8 This explanation, however, covers only a small category of cases in which significant thirdparty interests are at stake, and it does not go far in explaining the
fairness defense.
2. Effiiency.-As a general matter, equitable defenses are at
odds with efficiency goals because they undermine rational calculation. Occasionally, however, a fairness defense can be used to avoid
inefficient consequences of a specific remedy. One tenet of economic analysis in contract law is that breach is sometimes more efficient than performance, and efficient breach should be encouraged.
Specifically, breach is efficient if the promisor can realize a net gain
in the form of higher profits or saved costs by refusing to perform
and applying the resources performance would command to another use.' °9 As long as the damage measure compensates the
promisee for the lost value of her bargain, the choice to breach is
efficient because it allows the resources to be applied to a highervalued use."o
The concept of efficient breach does not mean that a damage
106. Whitlow v. Board of Educ., 108 Kan. 604, 196 P. 772 (1921).
107. See id.
108. The parties may negotiate a different result. The effect of the equitable defense
is to allocate an entitlement to the third party for purposes of bargaining over the
resource.
109. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 28, at 31-34; R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.8, at 10607, 118; Bishop, supra note 38, at 299-300; Goetz & Scott, Effcient Breach, supra note 28,
at 558-59; Ulen, supra note 38, at 344-45. Efficient breach theory is criticized in D. LIAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 369-80; Linzer, supra note 38, at 117-34, 138-39; MacNeil, supra
note 38, at 950-57; Wolcher, supra note 28, at 838-43, 864.
The notion of efficient breach is consistent with Justice Holmes's view of contract
obligation as an option to perform or pay damages for breach. See Holmes, Path of the
Law, 10 HAv. L. REV. 456, 462 (1897); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNAcrs ch. 16, at
100 (1981) (introductory note). See R. POSNER, supra note 38, at 106.
110. Economists often defend the expectancy measure in terms of efficient breach.
Faced with liability for the value of the promisee's bargain, a rational promisor will
breach if, but only if, an alternative use of resources has a higher value. See A. POLINSKY,
supra note 28, at 32-34; R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4,8, at 108; Cooter & Eisenberg,
supra note 28, at 1463; Farber, supra note 28, at 321 (neoclassical model). Cf. Farber,
supra note 103 (due to costs of detection and enforcement, expectancy damages do not
result in optimal performance and breach).
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remedy is more efficient than a specific performance remedy. Damages permit the promisor to breach, while specific performance
compels performance on pain of contempt. But the parties can bargain out of any remedy decreed by the court. Thus a judge's choice
between specific performance and damages does not necessarily determine whether performance will occur. Its real impact is its effect
on the transaction costs of collateral negotiation."'

From this conclusion a number of elaborate transaction-cost
analyses have followed. There may be ex ante costs in negotiating
alternative sanctions for breach," 12 ex post costs in negotiating a compromise," l1 ex post cover costs," l4 and probably other costs as

well." 5 All such costs in the wake of a remedial decision are without
economic benefit because they are spent on distributing wealth bei 6
tween parties, with no new gain in efficiency."
The debate over transaction costs has not yielded a general

conclusion in favor of damages or specific performance. Nevertheless, in some situations it is clear that bargaining out of specific performance will be very costly. An example is Van Wagner Advertising
Corp. v. S & M Enterprises." 7 The contract at issue in Van Wagner was
a lease of billboard space on a building wall facing an exit from the
Queens-Midtown Tunnel in New York City."' The lease had about
nine years to run at the time of the suit. Shortly after entering into
the lease, the lessor sold the building to S & M, a real estate developer with plans that undoubtedly called for the demise of the billboard." 9 When S & M attempted to cancel the lease, the lessee,
111. See R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.11. at 118; Bishop, supra note 38, at 300; MacNeil, supra note 38, at 950-57; Ulen, supra note 38, at 369-70.
112. See Kronman, supra note 38, at 365-69; Schwartz, Specific Performance, supra note
23, at 278-84; Yorio, supra note 38, at 1377-80.
113. See R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.11, at 118; Bishop, supra note 39, at 311-14;
Kronman, supra note 38, at 365-69; Schwartz, Specific Performance, supra note 23, at 28486; Ulen, supra note 38, at 379-83; Yorio, supra note 38, at 1380-81.
114. See R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 20.3, at 513-14; Bishop, supra note 38, at 314-16;
Schwartz, supra note 38, at 286-91; Ulen, supra note 38, at 385-89; Yorio, supra note 38,
at 1381-85.
115. See MacNeil, supra note 38, at 957-60 (transaction costs are too complex and variable to permit useful efficiency analysis).
116. From an economic perspective, costs spent in redistributing wealth are "dead
weight" social costs. They produce no new movement in resources; therefore they undercut the overall efficiency of the breach. Schwartz, Specific Performance, supra note 23, at
285. See R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 3.7, at 55.
117. 67 N.Y.2d 186, 492 N.E.2d 756, 501 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1986).
118. Id. at 189, 492 N.E.2d at 757, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
119. Id. at 190, 492 N.E.2d at 758, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
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Van Wagner, brought an action for specific performance. 120
In effect, a specific performance remedy would have given the
billboard lessee a stake in the real estate project that was not part of
its original bargain. 12 1 It does not require sophisticated economic
analysis to conclude that high transaction costs would have ensued.' 2 2 And in fact, an efficiency-minded court denied specific performance on the ground of "undue hardship."' 12 3 It is hard to
invoke sentiments of altruism and humanity in favor of this defendant, a New York real estate developer. But a hardship defense
makes sense in terms of efficiency.
Efficiency, however, is at best a limited explanation for a special
defense to specific performance. Van Wagner is an exceptional case,
in which the potentially large transaction costs were obvious. Much
more often, analysis of transaction costs on a case-by-case basis will
be costly and uncertain. And there is no gain in efficiency unless the
benefit of allowing the defense exceeds the cost of litigating its
applicability.
3. DistributiveEffects.-Economists are not concerned with the
ultimate distribution of gains resulting from an efficient breach between parties; they care only about the transaction costs of negotiation.1 24 But the parties are interested, and the choice between
specific and substitutional relief can affect their respective wealth.
120. Id.
121. There is no indication that the lessee bargained for a share of future development opportunities, nor that it attained its leverage through an investment in productive
information. Cf. Kronman, Mistake, supra note 21, at 9-18 (discussing the social value of
protecting the right to profit from deliberately acquired information). In fact, the lessor
had reserved a right to terminate the lease in anticipation of a sale. Van Wagner, 67
N.Y.2d at 189-90, 492 N.E.2d at 758, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
122. These parties are likely to be hostile and intransigent. See D. L.AYCOCK, supra note
3, at 340-41, 912-13 (bilateral monopoly); A. POLINSKY, supra note 28, at 18-19 (strategic
behavior); R. POSNER, supra note 38, §§ 4.8, 4.11, at 106, 118-19 (bilateral monopoly);
Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite--The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE LJ. 1, 18-19
(1970) (spite).
123. Van Wagner, 67 N.Y.2d at 195, 492 N.E.2d at 761, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 633. The
court did not rely expressly on efficiency in this part of its opinion, but it obviously was
familiar with current economic literature. See id. at 192-93, 492 N.E.2d at 759-60, 501
N.Y.S.2d at 632 (discussing substitutability of performance).
To temper the risk of undercompensation, the court combined its denial of specific
performance with a liberal treatment of damage rules. Id. at 195-96, 492 N.E.2d at 76162, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34. For example, the lessee's damage claim might have failed
the test of certainty of proof due to contingencies in the lease. See, e.g., RESTATkMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981). But the court relaxed the normal requirement of
certainty and resolved doubts in favor of the lessee. See 67 N.Y.2d at 195-96, 492 N.E.2d
at 761-62, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34.
124. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 28, at 7-10, 119-27; R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 3.7, at
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Both remedies protect the promisee's expectations, 125 but they allocate the benefits of breach to opposite parties. One function of an
equitable defense is to alter that allocation.
This explanation of the fairness defense rests on two factual
premises, which are not present in all cases. The first is that a damage remedy will compensate the promisee for the value she placed
on performance. There are a variety of defects in the damage remedy that belie this assumption, but it holds true in some cases, such
26
as sales of relatively fungible land.
The second premise is that breach of the contract is efficient in
that it is possible for the promisor to compensate the promisee for
the lost value of performance and still profit. There are several reasons why a breach may turn out to be efficient. The promisor may
have new opportunities that offer higher profits than the original
contract. 127 Or the promisor may have encountered difficulties that
increase the cost of performance beyond what she anticipated and
beyond the consideration provided for in the contract.' 28 The new
costs may be monetary costs, or subjective costs that arise because
the promisor's valuation has changed and she regrets her initial
29
choice.
55; Goetz & Scott, Efficient Breach, supra note 28, at 568; Schwartz, Specific Performance,
supra note 23, at 285; Ulen, supra note 38, at 370.
125. See supra notes 28, 103 and accompanying text.
126. Reasons why damages may not fully compensate the promisee are discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 161-172. The assumption that damages and performance
have equal value for the promisee also conflicts with the maxim that specific performance is not available when damages are adequate. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. When land is involved, however, courts have granted specific performance
without serious inquiry into the adequacy of damages. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herring, 42
N.C. 190 (1851); D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 12.10, at 847-48. See also Laycock, supra note
29, at 691-93, 701-03 (suggesting that there is no real adequacy limit).
127. For illustrations, see R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.8, at 107; Linzer, supra note
38, at 114-16. The Van Wagner case is a real life example; the property at issue would be
much more valuable as part of a new development than in its current incarnation as a
billboard. See Van Wagner, 67 N.Y.2d 186, 492 N.E.2d 756, 501 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1986)
(discussed supra at text accompanying notes 117-123). But see D. LAYCOCK, supra note 3,
at 369-70 (suggesting that what appears to be efficiency may really be an error in assessment of value to the promisee).
128. For illustrations, see R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.8, at 106-07; Ulen, supra note
38, at 353. Impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose are defenses to
both damages and specific performance, but the fairness defense has a longer reach. See
Castaldi v. Multer, 117 A.D.2d 699, 498 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1986); Patel v. Ali, [1984] 1 Ch.
283; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 comment a (1981); E. YORIO, supra
note 2, § 5.4.2, at 109-10. Materials on impracticability and frustration are collected
supra at note 53.
129. Courts are not quick to give relief on the basis of troubles that arise after the
contract is made, but they may do so if the promisor's difficulties are extreme in propor-
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Whatever the source of potential gains from breach, a specific
performance remedy allocates them to the promisee, while a damage remedy allocates them to the promisor. If the court grants specific performance, the promisee controls the resources, and can
force the promisor to pay to regain them.' 30 The promisor will pay
any amount up to the full value they hold for her in terms of opportunity or saved cost. On the other hand, if the court limits the
promisee's remedy to damages the promisor is free to keep
whatever she can gain from the breach (after paying for the promisee's lost performance value). Professor Christopher Wonnell has
called the promisee's interest in a share of gains from breach her
"extortion interest."''
Specific performance vindicates the extortion interest; damages do not.
An equitable fairness defense allows the judge to manipulate
the distribution of gains from breach. 13 2 For example, in Patel v.
Ali,'33 Mrs. Ali had agreed to sell her home to the Patels. Due to
complications beyond either party's control, the closing was delayed
for more than four years.'3 4 Meanwhile, Mrs. Ali developed cancer
and lost a leg. She also had two new babies. And her husband went
to jail. 13 51 Then the Patels sued for specific performance of their
contract.
By the time of the suit, Mrs. Ali was heavily dependent on
nearby relatives and friendly neighbors. As a result, her idiosyncratic valuation of the house had increased and she regretted her
contractual choice.' 3 6 In plainer terms, she did not want to give up
her home. The court's response was to deny specific performance
tion to the benefit of specific performance to the promisee. For an example of unforeseen monetary costs, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 comment a,
illustration 4 (1981) (farmer B's cows are overtaken by a disease). For examples of a
change in the promisor's subjective valuation, see Castaldi, 117 A.D.2d 699, 498
N.Y.S.2d 438 (defendants and their eight children could not find another house); Patel,
[1984] 1 Ch. 283 (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 133-139).
130. See R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.11, at 118. In effect, the promisor is the owner
of the promisee's resources. See MacNeil, supra note 38, at 962-63.
131. Wonnell, The Abstract Characterof Contract Law, 22 CONN. L.REv.437, 480 (1990);
see also E. YORIO, supra note 2, § 4.3.3, at 84-86, § 15.5, at 396. Not all observers would
call this extortion. See D. LAYcOCK, supra note 3, at 370-71.
132. Professor Yorio makes the point that an equitable defense can prevent the promisee from demanding an overcompensatory settlement. E. YoRIo, supra note 2, § 4.3.3,
at 84-86.
133. [1984] 1 Ch. 283.
134. The main obstacle to closing was that a co-owner of the property had disappeared and could not be served with process. Id. at 285-86.
135. Id. at 286.
136. See Goetz & Scott, Efficient Breach, supra note 28, at 568-77 (idiosyncratic value);
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on the ground of hardship, but leave open the possibility of a dam37
ages claim.'
Looking at the facts of Patel v. Ali, it is easy to see how the
choice between specific and substitutional relief affects the distribution of value between parties. Breach had a large subjective value
for Mrs. Ali. Specific performance placed this value in the control of
the Patels, t s3 but a fairness defense returned it to Mrs. Ali. The
Patels would realize the value they placed on the house, but no
more. 139
This interpretation of the fairness defense raises difficult questions about when a particular distribution of benefits from breach is
unfair. In many cases it may be perfectly just to allocate the gain to
the promisee by means of specific performance. The promisor
agreed to perform and took the risk of a change in her valuation of
the resources she committed to performance. In fact, Professor
Kronman, Paternalism,supra note 21, at 780-82 (regret of contractual choice); Wolcher,
supra note 28, at 799-803 (same).
Apart from distribution of gains from breach, specific relief also may make the experience of regret more vivid. Professor Kronman has suggested that the psychological
effect of regret is greatest when the promisee must perform in kind. A damage remedy
allows a promisee to distance herself from the consequences of her choice and "depersonalize" her regret. Kronman, Paternalism,supra note 28, at 783.
137. See [1984] 1 Ch. at 288. Another example is Castaldi v. Multer, 117 A.D.2d 699,
498 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1986) (specific performance of a purchase and sale contract would
cause hardship on defendant's eight children).
138. The Patels, as rational economic actors, would settle with Mrs. Ali for some
amount between the value of the house to them and its value to Mrs. Ali. But if, as is
likely, she had little to pay, the Patels might insist on performance and the value of the
breach would be lost.
139. The court made clear that the Patels were entitled to a damage remedy. See
[1984] 1 Ch. at 288-89. Normally, damages for a deliberate breach include compensation for the lost value of the bargain. See infra note 153.
The same account of the fairness defense-as a means of controlling the distribution of gains from breach- could apply to a case in which the gain results from an
opportunity for higher profit rather than an increase in costs. In Van Wagner, for example, the billboard lessor could make more money from a new development than it could
from a billboard lease. Specific performance would have allowed the lessee to control
this value, while an equitable defense allocated it to the lessor. See Van Wagner Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enters., 67 N.Y.2d 186, 194-95, 492 N.E.2d 756, 760-61, 501
N.Y.S.2d 628, 633 (1986) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 117-123). See E.
YORIO, supra note 2, § 15.5, at 396.
In terms of fair distribution, a case of this type is not as compelling as Patel v. Ali.
One difference is that the promisor will realize affirmative value from the alternative use
of resources, which it can apply to a settlement with the promisee. In contrast, the result
of Mrs. Ali's breach was a saving of subjective value, which she could not use to pay off
the Patels. Nevertheless, in a case such as Van Wagner, in which the new opportunity is
well outside the range of values explicitly or implicitly allocated in the contract, it is hard
to see why the promisee should enjoy a windfall share.
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Dawson suggested that a damages remedy that allows the promisor
to gain from a breach is an unjust enrichment at the expense of the
promisee.' 40 But sometimes the events that cause a change in valuation are outside any plausible view of risk allocation and voluntary
choice.' 4 ' It is hard to maintain that the Patels deserved to share in
the benefit Mrs. Ali obtained by her breach, or that specific perform42
ance is necessary to vindicate Mrs. Ali's personal autonomy.'
The important point is that whatever its substantive content, an
equitable defense based on fair distribution of gains from breach
addresses a real difference between specific and substitutional relief.
If there are cases in which it is unfair to allow the promisee to control the proceeds of an efficient breach, a defense that applies only
to specific performance and not to damages is understandable. On
the other hand, allocation of gains from breach is only a partial explanation of equitable defenses. It applies to a certain type of case,
in which there are net benefits from breach (after compensating the
promisee's expectation interest) and the reason for the defense is to
prevent an unfair distribution of those benefits.' 14 Applications of
the fairness defense that do not fit this profile need another
rationale.

140. See Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 175, 186-89 (1959) (favoring
a profit measure of damages for breach).
141. In Patel v. Ali, for example, there was not only an extraordinary series of misfortunes, but also an unusual delay in closing the sale. The extended time span of the
contract helped to distinguish Mrs. Ali's difficulties from the normal risk of changed
conditions. See [1984] 1 Ch. at 288.
A fairness defense based on distribution of gains from breach should be confined to
cases in which there is a large increase in the promisor's cost of performance due to
conditions that are outside the range of risks associated with the contract. It might also
be limited to transactions that affect important distributive interests of the parties, such
as the sale of a home. Cf. Kronman, Paternalism,supra note 21, at 771-72. And the court
should satisfy itself that a damage remedy will at least compensate the promisee for
reliance loss. See [ 1984] 1 Ch. at 289 (escrow order pending determination of damages).
142. Cf. C. FRIED, supra note 28, at 20 ("holding people to their obligations is a way of
taking them seriously"). Fried states that proper respect for the promisor's autonomy
entails an expectancy remedy, though he does not discuss specific performance. Id. at
20-21. But see Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MICH. L. REV. 489, 517-20 (1989) (an autonomy-based theory of contract obligation
does not dictate a choice of remedy); Wolcher, supra note 28, at 826-30 (same).
143. A court might be moved to deny specific performance on distributive grounds
even when a damage remedy will not fully compensate the promisee's expectations. But
in that case an equitable defense is more problematic: it does more than just redistribute gains available from breach, and it operates at the expense of the purposes served by
an expectancy measure of damages. Thus it overlaps with the issues discussed infra at
subpart II(B).
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4. Relational Considerations.-Thereis one other type of case in
which an equitable fairness defense might be explained in terms of
the different remedial effects of specific and substitutional relief.
The setting for this category is a long-term business relationship
governed by a contract the court finds to be unconscionably onesided in its allocation of risk. At the point of breach and enforcement, the objectionable risk may or may not have materialized. If it
has, there is no difference between specific and monetary relief;
both enforce the contractual allocation of risk. But if the risk that
makes the contract unfair has not yet come to pass, specific performance perpetuates the risk, while a damage remedy does not.
For example, assume a farmer has contracted to sell several

years' output of carrots to a corporate buyer at a fixed price.' 44 The
contract is a printed form prepared by the buyer, which gives the
buyer wide powers to refuse delivery of carrots but forbids the
farmer to sell elsewhere without the buyer's consent. Rightly or not,
the court finds these terms unconscionable. The buyer, however,
has not attempted to refuse carrots. Instead, the farmer breached in
order to accept a higher offer from someone else.
At least if the unconscionable terms are inseparable from the
rest of the contract, specific performance requires the farmer to continue the relation on those terms-the buyer still has the right to
reject carrots.1 45 A damage remedy releases the farmer from the
harsh refusal terms, though it holds her to the agreed price. In the
right case, this difference may be a reason to recognize a fairness
46
defense, applicable only to specific performance.
144. This example is based loosely on the facts of Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172
F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). The contract in Campbell Soup was for one season's output only.
The court denied specific performance on the ground of unconscionability, leaving
Campbell's with a liquidated damages remedy. Id. at 83. The case is discussed in D.
LAYcocx, supra note 3, at 367-72.

145. If the terms of the contract are separable, the court can grant specific performance, but condition the remedy in a way that removes the offending terms. See Leasco
Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1972) (ordering specific performance of
sale of corporation on the condition that the parties agree on a more equitable price);
Jensen v. Southwestern States Management Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 437, 443, 629 P.2d 752,
757 (1981) (refusing to order specific performance of a 50-year-old mineral deed that
gave the owner an option to purchase the use of the surface, unless the owner agreed to
pay current market value); E. YoRIo, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 14-15. Conditional relief is a
traditional feature of equity under the maxim that one who seeks equity must do equity.
See H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5, § 25, at 55-56; 2J. POMEROY, supra note 4, §§ 388, 392.
A similar remedial discretion is incorporated in the unconscionability provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1977).
146. Professor Dobbs defends the Campbell Soup case on a different basis. He argues
that by recognizing an equitable defense and limiting the promisee to damages, the
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There are several problems with this use of a fairness defense.
First, it only postpones to another case the difficult question of unconscionability as a complete defense to enforcement. If the risks
imposed on the promisor by a one-sided contract do materialize (for
example, if the buyer refuses a shipment of carrots), the court will
have to decide what degree of procedural or substantive imbalance
justifies tampering with the agreed terms of exchange.'47
Second, the assumption that a damage remedy will protect the
promisee's expectations is especially tenuous in the context of a
long-term contract. Specific performance is available for enforcement of long-term contracts because damages are too uncertain; the
court cannot predict the value of future performance with reasonable accuracy at the time of trial.141 Problems of this kind are always
in the background when the court considers an equitable defense,
because specific performance becomes important only when damages are not satisfactory to the promisee. But the defects of the
damage remedy are more serious in long-term contract cases than in
other typical specific performance cases such as sales of land. This
means that an equitable defense may cut considerably into the
promisee's expectation interest.
B.

Equitable Defenses as a Means of Compromise

In many cases, an equitable defense is not just a choice between
specific and substitutional methods of protecting the promisee's expectations; it is also a decision not to protect the expectation interest. Because of defects in the damage remedy, an equitable defense
produces a compromise that denies the promisee the full benefit of
149
the bargain, while still affording some compensation for loss.
This function of equitable defenses is easiest to see when the
court was able to announce a new standard for future cases (that certain provisions will
not be enforced) without upsetting the promisee's expectations. D. DOBBS, supra note 3,
§ 2.4, at 48-49. In one sense, this view is similar to the explanation set out later in this
Article under the heading of "acoustic separation." See infra subpart II(C). It is justified,
if at all, as a strategy for reconciling decision and conduct rules, and not on the basis of
functional differences between specific performance and damages.
147. Materials on unconscionability are collected supra at note 23.
148. See, e.g., Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 158 Md. 486, 145 A. 378 (1929);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 comment b & illustration 4 (1981); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 16-3, at 664; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23,
§ 12.6, at 859.
149. Professor Yorio defends equitable defenses as a source of remedial flexibility.
See E. YORIO, supra note 2, §§ 4.3, 4.5.2. I agree with his observations on the effect of
equitable defenses, but I prefer a more direct solution. See infra text accompanying
notes 208-210.
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principal feature of the case is an unequal exchange of value
brought about by the promisor's unilateral mistake or general lack
of sophistication. In this situation there is no inherent difference
between specific and substitutional remedies. Either way, enforcing
the bargain will impose a hardship on the promisor. The possibility
of compromise arises because damages often do not meet their
stated goal of enforcing the promisee's bargain.
Panco v. Rogers, the case of the elderly carpenter, is an example.' 5 0 Mr. Panco thought he was selling his home for $12,500, but
signed an agreement with the Rogers that stated a price of $5500. 151
Specific performance would hold Mr. Panco to the bargain ($5500).
An equitable defense leaves the Rogers with a damage remedy that
is supposed to protect their expectancy. But for reasons explained
below, damages may not give the Rogers the full value of their bargain. In these circumstances, a decision to deny specific performance may be a sign that the court does not find the promisee's
expectancy claim compelling. But if so, an equitable defense is not
the right solution. Rather than confusing the issue with references
to the moral character of equity, courts should reconsider why and
when the expectation interest deserves protection.
1. The Bargain Principle.11 2 -The first rule of contract enforcement is that the remedy for breach should put the promisee in the
position she would have been in if the promisor had performed: she
is entitled to the expected benefit of her bargain.' 53 The promisee
can pursue alternative remedies based on reliance (the loss resulting
from the transaction) and restitution (the benefits conferred on the
promisor), but these usually are viewed as incidental to the primary
150. See 19 N.J. Super. 12, 87 A.2d 770 (Ch. Div. 1952) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 6-15).
151. Id. at 16, 87 A.2d at 771.
152. This term is borrowed from Professor Eisenberg, who uses it to describe the rule
that a valid contract is enforceable by remedies that give the promisee her expectancy.
See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 742.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) & comment a, § 347 & comment
a (1981);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-4; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4,
§ 992; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 12.1, at 840-42; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5,
§ 1338, at 198; Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 744-45; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 114749. Some courts make an exception to the normal measure in certain land-sale cases
when the seller is unable to perform as a result of a defect in her title. The buyer's
remedy is limited to restitution and compensation for expenses. But a seller who deliberately breaches a land-sale contract is likely to be held to expectancy damages. See J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-30; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, §§ 1097-98; D.
DOBBS, supra note 3, § 12.8, at 833-36; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 177-79 (1952); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 22, § 15.7, at 421-26.
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remedy, which compensates lost expectations.'-" Reliance and restitution remedies are most likely to come into play when an expectancy claim fails for want of proof. If the contract is enforceable and
an expectancy remedy is feasible, the promisee can demand the full
value of her bargain.
The alternative to full enforcement is rescission, if the promisor
can establish an appropriate defense.' 5 5 According to traditional
views of rescission, the promisor's contract obligation is expunged
and the promisee has no further basis for a compensatory claim,
even to the extent of losses suffered in reliance.' 5 6 The only avenue
remaining to the promisee is a restitution claim for benefits con154. On reliance and restitution as alternative measures of recovery, see RESTATE§§ 344(b), (c), 349, 373 (1981);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO,
supra note 4, §9 14-9, 15-5; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, §§ 1031-35, 1104; D. DOBBS, supra
note 3, § 12.1, at 787, 791-95; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 12.1, at 842-44, § 12.16;
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 53-57 (identifying contract interests and urging
greater attention to reliance).
Although the promisee can elect to recover on the basis of reliance or restitution,
the value of her expectancy is a limit on reliance claims. A restitution measure sometimes exceeds the expectancy measure, but it is not likely to include profits the promisor
derived from breach. The problem of losing contcats is discussed in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 349 comment a, 373(2) f&comments b, c, & d (1981); 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 4, §§ 1033, 1113; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 12.16, at 928,
§ 12.20, at 931-35; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 22, §§ 4.3, 4.4; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at
1175-85. On restitution of a breaching party's profits, see 1 G. PALMER, supra note 22,
§ 4.9(a), (b); Dawson, supra note 140, at 186-89 (favoring a profit measure). Cf. supra
note 109 (efficient breach).
155. The origin and nature of the rescission remedy are discussed supra at note 24 and
in the sources cited there.
156. See H. BLACK, supra note 24, § 704; G. CLARK, supra note 5, § 278, at 408 & n.6; E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 9.9; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 22, § 7.6, at 129-30 (impossibility), § 12.8(a), at 603-04 (mistake in assumption); E. Yoio, supra note 2, § 4.5.2, at
97; 13 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 1542, at 71; Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 40 (1981) (noting change in the second Restatement). The main source of protection against reliance loss is a defense based on
detrimental change of position. See 3 H. BLACK, supra note 24, § 618; G. CLARK, supra
note 5, § 294, at 425; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 4.6, at 280-81; 13 S. WILISTON, supra
note 5, § 1595.
There is no good reason why courts should not allow an affirmative reliance claim;
the obstacle is a conceptual one, that rescission nullifies the basis for a compensatory
claim. A number of scholars over the years have argued for greater attention to reliance
loss in connection with rescission. See, e.g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2), 46 YALE LJ. 373, 379-86 (1937); Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest," 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704, 716-17 (1982); McClintock, supra note 59, 478-80
(permitting recovery of reliance losses enables courts to allow rescission for negligent
unilateral mistakes); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 22, §§ 7.6(a), 12.8(b); 3 id. § 15.9; Perillo,
supra, at 38-42 (discussing the Restatement's categorization of reliance and restitution
remedies); Sharp, Promissoty Liability (pt. 2), 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 250, 267 (1940) (reliance
relief should not be confined to cases of mutual mistake). Some also advocate loss sharing, particularly in the context of impossibility. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 21; Note,
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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ferred on the promisor, based on the independent ground of unjust
enrichment. 57 In fact, courts are not always so rigid; they occasionally require the promisor to compensate the promisee for out-ofpocket or preparatory expenses as a condition of rescission.' 5 8 But
reliance damages have not emerged as a regular alternative when
full enforcement will produce a harsh result. The choice is usually
between an expectancy
remedy if the contract is enforceable and
159
restitution if it is not.
Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutoy Solution, 69 YALE L.J.
1054 (1960).
The second Restatement seems at times to encourage flexibility in the adjustment of
rights following rescission. In case of discharge for mistake or impossibility, the court is
told to "grant relief on such terms as justice requires including protection of the parties'
reliance interests."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoN'rAAcrs §§ 158(2), 272(2) (1981).

But comments elsewhere suggest that the drafters did not approve a general practice of
compensating reliance in connection with rescission. See id. § 377 comment b (restitution following discharge for impossibility does not include compensation for expenditures in reliance); Perillo, supra at 39-40 (noting inconsistency in the Restatement).
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 comment a, § 377 comment a
(1981); D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 4.3, at 254-55. The Restatement defines restitution in
terms of benefit conferred on the other party (the promisor, in the context of this Article). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs §§ 344(c), 370 & comment a, 371
(1981). Cf. RESTATEMENT OF REsTIuTION § 1 & comment e (enrichment not always essential). The term "benefit" is capable of broad interpretation, so that restitution sometimes merges into protection of reliance interests. For example, expenses the promisee
incurs in preparation for performance of her part of the contract can be characterized as
a "bargained-for" benefit to the promisor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 370 & comment a (1981); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 22, § 1.8; 2 id. § 6.3(a), at 18-21
(contracts unenforceable under the statute of frauds); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at
71. But as long as the emphasis is on benefit, restitution theory does not reach the full
range of consequential losses that might be compensated under a reliance measure of
damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 comment a (1981); 2 G.
PALMER, supra note 22, § 7.6(a), at 130-31; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 71-75, 78
(distinguishing between "essential" reliance and "incidental" reliance). For a helpful
discussion of the elements of reliance loss, see Hudec, supra note 156, at 719-28.
Some writers have questioned the equation of restitution with unjust enrichment.
At least in the context of failed contracts, they prefer to conceive of restitution as a wider
process of adjustment between parties. See Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61
B.U.L. REV. 563, 569-70, 585-600, 620-21 (1981); Perillo, supra note 156, at 38-39 n.17.
158. See, e.g., Board of Regents of Murray State Normal School v. Cole, 209 Ky. 761,
768, 273 S.W.2d 508, 511 (1925) (allowing a contractor to recover expenses when he
had erred in calculating a bid); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Metzger, 167 Md. 27, 32-33, 172
A. 610, 612 (1934) (requiring insurance company whose clerk made an overcompensation error to compensate a beneficiary for expenses in reliance on the error); R. Zoppo
Co. v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 401, 406-08, 232 N.E.2d 346, 349-51 (1967) (allowing
recovery for preparatory expenses, anticipated profits, and work completed before the
contract was rendered impossible); Albre Marble & Tile Co. v. John Bowen Co., 338
Mass. 394, 401, 155 N.E.2d 437, 441 (1959) (requiring defendant to pay plaintiff for all
acts performed "in conformity with the specific request of the defendant" in connection
with a contract rendered impossible).
159. Occasionally, a court may disregard standard remedial doctrine and shift deliber-
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Against this background, equitable defenses provide a rough
compromise between full enforcement and rescission. In theory, an
equitable defense does not displace the bargain principle because
the damage remedy remains intact. But in practice there are several
reasons why damages may not fully compensate for the lost value of
performance.
The first problem is translating performance into money. In
economic terms, all goods and services have substitutes (other
goods and services the promisee would be equally happy to obtain)." But when market information is scarce or the contract has
personal value for the promisee, a court cannot easily identify a substitute and damages may not be accurate. ' t
These valuation problems are highlighted by the adequacy test,
which limits the operation of equitable remedies and defenses to
cases in which the court has determined that damages are suspect.
A land sale is the least troubling, because there often is an active
market. But even in land sales, personal preferences and the scale
62
of the transaction affect the accuracy of expectancy damages.'
Further, the promisee may run into strategic difficulty in proving the
value of her expectancy after opposing an equitable defense. Evidence she offered earlier to show that the contract was not as harsh
as the promisor claimed will tend to undercut her claim for loss of
63
bargain.'
There are also some doctrinal limits on contract damages. One
of these is the rule of Had/ey v. Baxendale," 4 which limits consequentately from an expectancy measure to a reliance measure. See, e.g., Sullivan v. O'Connor,
363 Mass. 579, 588, 296 N.E.2d 183, 189-90 (1973). In Sullivan, the court decided that a
contract to improve the appearance of the plaintiff's nose was not the sort of bargain
that should be enforced in full. Instead, the appropriate remedy was compensation for
losses the plaintiff suffered in reliance, including the pain and suffering she endured. Id.
at 587, 296 N.E.2d at 188-89. See G. GI.MORE, THE DATH OF CONTRACr 87-93 (1974)
(discussing the "reabsorption" of contract into tort).
160. This concept is qualified in Kronman, supra note 38, at 358-61. See also R. PosNER, supra note 38, § 1.1, at 4-5 ("the law of demand").
161. See R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.11, at 117-18; Goetz & Scott, Efficient Breach,
supra note 28, at 568-73; Kronman, supra note 38, at 360-63; Linzer, supra note 38, at
116-17; Schwartz, Specific Performance,supra note 23, at 274-77.
162. The traditional assumption that land is unique is sometimes questioned. See E.
FARNswoRT-, supra note 23, § 12.6, at 860-61 & n.22. But at least in the case of residential property, land often has special subjective value. Further, the purchase-and-sale
transaction is likely to be lengthy and personalized. Even if land can be valued, damages
may not take account of intangible incidental costs. See D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 12.13,
at 861 (discussing vendor's remedies); Laycock, supra note 29, at 703-05.
163. In a merged court, the promisee can request alternative remedies, but will have
to argue against an equitable defense and for expectancy damages in the same trial.
164. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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ial damages to losses that were foreseeable at the time of agreement. 165 This means that if Mr. Panco's breach caused the Rogers a
loss not commonly associated with land sales, one aspect of the
value of performance (avoidance of that loss) will not be compensated. Another limiting rule places the burden of proof of damages
on the promisee and requires that she prove the lost value of the
bargain with "reasonable certainty."' 1 6 If the Rogers hoped to
profit from some enterprise for which Mr. Panco's land was uniquely
suited, they may lose this value because proof of loss is not sufficiently certain.'

67

Another pitfall for the promisee is the elasticity of the legal concept of value.16s The basic measure of contract damages is the value
of performance to the promisee, but courts often standardize their
calculations in objective terms. Unless the promisee can establish a
special valuation (consistent with the rules of certainty and foreseeability), her claim is limited to the difference between market value
and contract price.' 6 9 Further, objective measures of value can be
165. See id. at 151. The rule began with HadLey v. Baxenda/e and is now well established
as a limit on contract damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981);
J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-5, at 593; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1007;
D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 12.3, at 803; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 12.14, at 912-13;
11 S. WILLSTON, supra note 5, § 1356; E. YoRIo, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 187. The term
"foreseeability" does not completely describe the content courts have given this rule.
For example, courts may hold that emotional harm is too remote a loss to be compensated in a contract action, even if it was foreseeable. See, e.g., Valentine v. General Am.
Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 260-61, 362 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1984);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-5(b); D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 12.3, at 805-07. Cf.RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) (emotional harm generally not
compensable). Scholars most often explain the rule in terms of risk allocation, viewing it
either as a limit on the scope of contractual risk or as an incentive for efficient risk allocation between parties. See e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 3,§ 12.3, at 814-17; R. POSNER, supra
note 38, § 4.9; E. YoRIo, supra note 2, § 8.3.3; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1207-10;
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 84-88.
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981). The certainty requirement is discussed inJ. CALAMARi &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-8; 5 A. CORBIN, supra
note 4, § 1020; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 12.3, at 802-03; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23,
§ 12.15; 11 S. WLuSTON, supra note 5, § 1345; E. YORIO, supra note 2, § 8.4; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1210-15; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 373-77.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 comment b (1981);J. CALAMARI
&J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-8, at 601; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 12.3, at 802; E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 12.15, at 923-24.
168. See generally 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1004; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 3.2, at
143-48, § 12.1, at 788-90; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 1342.
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 comment b (198 1);J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-12; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 140; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 12.12, at 902-04; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1167. In addition
to market-based damages, the Uniform Commercial Code allows a disappointed buyer
to purchase a substitute and recoup her cover costs. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (cover), § 2-713
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stated in different ways. For example, the lost value that results
from defects in construction work can be described as either the cost
of repair or the loss in market value of the building-with very dif70
ferent results for the promisee.
Finally, there is the jury. At least when there are no incidental
damage claims, a claim for specific performance is an equitable
claim that will be tried before a judge in most courts. A damage
claim is a legal claim, in which the promisor is entitled to a jury
trial.' 71 A jury does not have to articulate the reasons for its deci-

sion, and when faced with the same facts that establish a fairness
defense to specific performance, it may be inclined to resolve doubts
about value in favor of the promisor.
Taking into account these constraints on the damage remedy,
the effect of an equitable defense may be to deny full enforcement
of the promisee's expectation interest, but at the same time to preserve her claim for some compensation for the effects of the breach.
The promisee will not receive the full benefit of her bargain. On the
other hand, she may get something. She can press her claim for the
lost bargain as far as problems of proof and measurement will allow,
or she can claim compensation for her losses in reliance on the
(difference between market value and contract price). SeeJ. WHITE &J. SUMMERS, supra
note 23, §§ 6-3, 6-4.
170. See, e.g., State Property & Bldgs. Comm'n v. H.W. Miller Co., 385 S.W.2d 211,
214 (Ky. App. 1964) (cost of repair or diminution in value, whichever is lower); Groves
v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 167, 286 N.W. 235, 237 (1939) (adopting cost of
repair standard in case of willful breach); Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382
P.2d 109, 111-13 (Okla. 1962) (diminution-in-value), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963);
Appalachian Power Co. v. John Stewart Walker, Inc., 214 Va. 524, 535-36, 201 S.E.2d
758, 767 (1974) (measure depends on promisee's motive in entering the contract). See
alsoJ. CALAMAi &J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-29; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, §§ 108990; D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 12.25; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 12.13, at 907-08;
D. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 922-29; Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1167-75; Linzer, supra
note 38, at 134-38; Wolcher, supra note 28, at 881-85 (discussing Groves and Peevyhouse).
According to the second Restatement, the promisee normally has a choice between
cost of repair and diminution of value. But if the court feels the cost of repair is disproportionate to the value the promisee places on the agreed performance, the promisee is
limited to the value measure (unless she can prove a special subjective value). In this
way, she may end up with a figure that is less than her personal valuation of the performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2) & comment c (1981).
171. The right to ajury trial is a complex problem. It is fair to say that if the promisee
requests specific performance alone, without supplemental damages, the promisor is not
entitled to a jury trial. If the promisee requests damages only, the promisor can demand
a jury trial. The mode of trial of a mixed claim for damages and specific performance
depends on whether the jurisdiction adopts an "historical" or "dynamic" approach to
jury trial. For summaries of jury trial issues and doctrine, see D. DOBBS, supra note 3,
§ 2.6, at 68-81; D. Laycock, supra note 3, at 1251-72; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2301, 2302 (1971).

1991]

contract.

LAW AND EQUITY IN CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT

293

172

2. Limits on the Bargain Principl.-Viewed in this way, an equitable defense may reflect the court's intuition that the bargain principle is out of place. The supposed basis for a special defense is a
moral distinction between law and equity. But the real reason may
be that full protection of the expectancy interest is not the promisee's "rightful position. "173

Protection of contract expectations has been the subject of a
continuing debate. 174 The conclusion that contracts create legal duties does not lead automatically to a remedy that compensates disappointed promisees for the lost value of their bargains.17 5 Writers on
this subject have identified some good reasons for an expectancy
remedy, but the reasons for full enforcement are not present in
76
every contract transaction.1
The best explanation for protection of the promisee's expectation interest is set out in Professor Fuller's classic article on contract
interests.' 77 Fuller said that an expectancy remedy has no intrinsic
justification, but is often the best way to protect against reliance
loss.' 78 Legal protection against losses incurred in reliance on a
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 & comment a (1981); J.
CALAMARI &J.PERILLO, supra note 4, § 14-9, at 603; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1033, at
204; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, § 12.16, at 928.
173. This phrase is borrowed from Professor Laycock. See D. LAYCOCK, supra note 3,
at 15.
174. Theoretical discussions of expectancy principle are collected supra at note 28.

My analysis in this section draws heavily on articles by Professors Eisenberg and Fuller.
See Eisenberg, supra note 21; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28.
175. Professor Craswell has made this point persuasively, with reference to several
theories of contract obligation. See Craswell, supra note 142, at 512-14, 517-20. See also
Wolcher, supra note 28, at 825-29 (a similar analysis).
176. This is a central theme in Professor Eisenberg's article on the bargain principle.
See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 748-49, 754, 798-801. Eisenberg identifies four arguments of fairness and efficiency in support of the bargain principle. See id. at 745-46; see
also id. at 787 (justifications for full enforcement of executory bargains). He observes
that these arguments are strongest in the case of a contract that was made in a competitive market and has been performed on one side. See id at 786. Away from that setting,
they are less persuasive. Id. at 746-48. He then develops four "norms of unconscionability" that apply when the market is unreliable and the arguments that support the
bargain principle are not applicable. See id. at 748-85. While I do not agree in all details
with his conclusions, I find his approach very helpful.
Fuller also argued that the justifications for an expectancy remedy lose force outside
the context of a "bilateral business agreement" in a competitive market. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 63-66 (contracts distant from the "credit system"); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 156, at 396-401 (contracts that are "too social").
177. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 57-66.
178. Id. at 61.
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contract serves commercial policies that are vital to our society-we
have a credit economy, which the law should support by promoting
reliance on mutual promises. 1 79 In a competitive market, the value
of performance is a fair surrogate for reliance loss because reliance
loss includes the lost opportunity to enter a similar contract with
someone else.' 8 0 Actual reliance (at least in the full sense of lost
opportunity) may be difficult to prove, so courts use an expectancy
measure to approximate reliance loss and to deter breaches that
8
cause reliance loss.' 1
Professors Goetz and Scott reach a similar conclusion by an
economic route. 1 2 Their ideal remedy is compensation for "prospective net reliance. 113 A promise causes the promisee to alter
consumption patterns in ways that will be efficient if the promisor
performs, but inefficient if the promisor does not perform.'i 4 The
prospective net reliance induced by a promise is the detriment that
could result from breach, less the benefit that could result from performance, times a factor representing the promisor's intention to
breach or perform. 8t ' According to Goetz and Scott, a remedy
based on this formula is desirable because it will lead the parties to
an optimal level of promissory activity.' 8 6
179. Fuller characterized this as a "juristic reason" for enforcement, as opposed to
the simpler "institutional" explanation that credit is pervasive in our economy. See id. at
60. The institutional fact of a credit-based economy is not a sufficient explanation because the economic value of promises depends on legal enforcement. Id. at 59. The
juristic explanation identifies a conscious judicial policy to foster a credit economy,
evolved through the interaction of courts with social and economic institutions. Id at
60.
180. The value of forgone opportunities is a real aspect of the promisee's loss in many
cases. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1440-41, 1448, 1456-59; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 55-56; Goetz & Scott, Basis of Contract, supra note 28, at 1269-70.
But it is very difficult to prove outside the context of a perfectly competitive market.
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1455; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 60. As a
result, damages under a reliance measure normally will be calculated on the basis of outof-pocket expenses. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 & illustrations 1-4
(1981) (focusing on expenses in performance or preparation for performance).
181. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 60-63.
182. See Goetz & Scott, Basis of Contract, supra note 28.
183. See id.
at 1282.
184. Id. at 1281.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1282-83. I am not convinced that this formula would produce optimal
promissory activity. My problem lies with the element of the formula that ties liability to
the promisor's intent to perform. The promisee does not know the promisor's intentions, and this uncertainty will affect her beneficial reliance and (in a reciprocal exchange) her willingness to transact. Even if the formula were based on objective
probability of performance, a risk-averse promisee might be reluctant to do business
under this remedial rule.
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The authors go on to say that in a competitive market, the
formula can be simplified."' Detrimental reliance will be roughly
equal to the value of performance, because it includes opportunity
cost and opportunity cost in a competitive market is the value of a
like transaction. 88 Beneficial reliance drops out, because other
market opportunities would yield the same benefit.' 8 9 The result
an expectancy measure of damages.'

9°

Another economic explanation for an expectancy measure of
damages relates to the notion of efficient breach.' 91 Efficient breach
theorists are concerned with the impact of remedial rules on the decision to breach or perform. Given a rational promisor, an expectancy measure ensures that breach will be efficient because it forces
the promisor to consider the promisee's loss of value.192 The promisor will breach the contract if but only if a different use of resources
193
has greater value.
There are several reasons why these justifications for an expectancy remedy may not hold true in a particular case. First, any argument that rests on the equation of expectancy and reliance requires
an active market.'
When the subject of the contract cannot be duplicated easily in a competitive market, it is no longer fair to assume
that opportunity costs are equal to the value of the promised per187. See id. at 1284-86.
188. Id. at 1284.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Materials on efficient breach are collected supra at note 109. The efficient breach
argument relates specifically to an expectancy remedy in the form of damages. Specific
performance may or may not be acceptable as an alternative remedy, depending on the
transaction costs of negotiating around specific performance. See supra notes 111-116
and accompanying text. But damages must be governed by an expectancy rule to ensure
that the promisor will internalize the costs of breach to the promisee.
192. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1463.
193. Id. at 1462-63. See also A. POuNSKY, supra note 28, at 31-32; R. POSNER, supra
note 38, § 4.8, at 108; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1463; Farber, Contract Law
and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 303, 321 (1983) (neoclassical model).
194. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 62-63, 65-66. See also Cooter & Eisenberg,
supra note 28, at 1451-55 (ultimately preferring an expectancy remedy for other reasons); Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 790 (suggesting that the buyer should bear the cost of
uncertainty); Goetz & Scott, Basis of Contract, supra note 28, at 1284 (assuming a wellorganized market).
Professor Eisenberg links the bargain principle to a competitive market in several
other ways. First, there is a general perception that a price set by private agreement in a
competitive market is fair, which may not hold true in other settings. Second, the policy
of encouraging credit transactions is a market-oriented policy. Third, the function of
privately agreed prices in moving resources to their highest use depends on a competitive market. Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 749-50.
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formance. In these cases, expectancy is not a reliable surrogate for
reliance.
Second, arguments for an expectancy remedy depend on the
integrity of the choice reflected in the contract. 9 5 The connection
between expectancy and reliance breaks down when lack of information or cognitive defects undermine the assumption that the agreed
price is the best evidence of value. If the price set for a promise is
too low (due to the promisor's mistake or disability), expectancy is
not equivalent to opportunity cost, because no like contracts were
available. Deals with deaf carpenters who do not read their contracts are not fungible.
Further, the expectancy measure is difficult to defend in terms
of efficient breach when the bargain is affected by cognitive or informational defects. Efficient breach theories assume that parties to a
contract are fully informed and rational, and that their agreement is
an accurate reflection of the values they placed on the subject matter. 19 6 If the promisor erred and priced performance too low, the
terms of the exchange are no longer good evidence of the value
each party places on the resources involved, and expectancy damages do not ensure that the resources will be allocated to their high19 7
est valued use.
There are other incentive reasons for enforcing contract obliga195. Eisenberg addresses this problem in his norms of unconscionability-particularly the norms of "transactional incapacity," Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 763, and "un-'
fair persuasion," id. at 765-66. See also Farber, supra note 193, at 322-39 (discussing
newer economic models that acknowledge the effects of imperfect information);
Kronman, Paternalism, supra note 21, at 786 (moral justifications for relief from poor
judgment when there are defects in the promisor's reasoning process); Sunstein, supra
note 21, at 1166 (flaws in private choice).
196. Economic models of efficient breach rest on the assumption (implicit or explicit)
that the parties understand their positions and will engage in a rational calculation of
costs and benefits (with appropriate adjustment for uncertainties). See, e.g., A. POLINSKY,
supra note 28, at 31-33; R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.8, at 106-08 (general economic
principles after breach); Goetz & Scott, Effient Breach, supra note 28, at 563-65. See also
R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 1.1, at 3-4 (assumption of rational choice); Eisenberg, supra
note 21, at 763-66, 775 (situations in which lack of information and sophistication undermine the efficiency of private exchange). .
197. When the price is an error, we do not know from the parties' agreement who
values the subject matter more. The promisee's expectancy is likely to be inflated by the
error beyond what is necessary to deter inefficient breach. And it is possible to imagine
a case in which an expectancy measure could lead to inefficient performance. For example, assume the court can estimate a market value for Mr. Panco's house, in the amount
of $10,000. Mr. Panco (who is ready to sell) places a personal value of $9000 on the
house. The Rogers value the house at $8000, and are delighted to buy for the price of
$5500 stated in the contract. Mr. Panco will have to pay damages of $4500 to keep the
house (the excess of market value over contract price). In these circumstances he will
perform, although he values the house more than the Rogers value it. If transactions
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tions despite an error in valuation, but these do not require an expectancy remedy. Assuming remedial rules can improve conduct, a
rule holding promisors liable for breach may induce them to obtain
better information and watch for mistakes.' 9" This objective, however, can be accomplished by holding promisors liable for losses
caused by their promises.' 99 Further, promisors who suffer from
cognitive and informational disadvantages are probably outside the
range of incentive rules. They may not know of the rule, and if they
do there may not be much they can do about it.
Apart from utilitarian and economic reasons for an expectancy
measure, some would say promisors should be held to their contracts on moral grounds. But even if one believes that a promise
made according to prevailing conventions is morally charged in a
liberal society, it does not follow that the promisor is bound to compensate the promisee for the lost benefit of the bargain. It may be
equally consistent with a liberal order to hold the promisor liable for
20
harm she caused by making the promise.
Thus in certain cases-those that are distant from a competitive
market and those in which the parties are not fully informed and
rational actors-there is no affirmative justification for an expectancy remedy. In these cases, the court can temper the effects of a
hard bargain without serious harm to other ideals. The promisee's
expectation of profit is not a fact the court must take into account; it
is a function of law, which should not be maintained at the prom-

were costless the house would find its way to a third party who values it at $10,000 or
more, but under real conditions transaction costs may slow or curtail the process.
198. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.4 (suggesting that a seller may have access
at lower cost to information that could help to avoid mistake), § 4.5 (impossibility);
Kronman, Mistake, supra note 21, at 5-8 (mistake).
199. Professor Kronman and Judge Posner have identified three broad economic
functions of contract law: to enforce agreed allocations of risk; to provide default rules
that will decrease the costs of exchange; and to discourage carelessness and other inefficient behavior in the process of exchange. The first two facilitate value-maximizing exchange, while the third prevents detrimental reliance on ill-considered promises. A.
KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 64, at 4-5.

When the contract does not represent a rational and informed choice on both sides,
the exchange may not maximize wealth. Thus, the only remaining justification for enforcement is the third, deterrent goal of contract law, which does not necessarily require
full enforcement of the bargain.
200. See Craswell, supra note 142, at 517-20 ("[a]ny damage measure is consistent with
the ideal of individual autonomy, as long as it is adopted solely as a default rule, since
any default rule expands the promisor's options"); Wolcher, supra note 28, at 829 ("different remedies allow different, but not necessarily better or worse, opportunities to
choose").
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isor's expense when supporting policies do not apply. 2 1
At the same time, it is important to protect the promisee's reliance interest. A risk of uncompensated loss will discourage transactions in general unless the risk is limited to a predictable set of
circumstances. Concern for the security of transactions may be
strongest in an active market, but individualized transactions also
have social and economic functions that merit legal protection. Nor
is the problem confined to transactions in which both parties are
informed and rational. Cognitive and informational defects may not
be evident to the promisee, and it is difficult to define them in a way
that will allow promisees to spot and avoid risky transactions. Moreover, concern for Mr. Panco does not justify a rule that will discour20 2
age transactions with deaf carpenters.
Another reason to protect the promisee's reliance interest is
that to the extent the promisor is aware of remedial rules, legal responsibility for the promisee's losses may encourage self-protection.2
Reliance damages cannot always be supported on this
ground. If there are palpable defects in the promisor's valuation,
the promisee is both the better risk-avoider and the party who ought
to bear the loss. 2 ° But when the promisee has no reason to know of
the problem, imposing liability for loss caused by a misjudged
promise may create desirable incentives for care.
Finally, it is just to require compensation for reliance loss. At
least to this extent, moral theories of contract obligation are persuasive. A promise made according to established conventions invites
reliance, and if the promisee has in fact relied in a reasonable way,
her loss should be corrected.20 5
201. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 57-60 (distinguishing "psychological" and
"institutional" explanations for an expectancy remedy from "juristic" explanations).
202. See Dawson, supra note 21, at 264; Epstein, supra note 20, at 304-05.
203. See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
204. See Kronman, Mistake, supra note 21, at 6-8.
205. Scholars writing from several different perspectives have assumed that it is
wrong to cause another harm by breaking a promise. See P. Anxmn, PROMISES, supra
note 28, at 64-69, 177-202; C. FRIED, supra note 28, at 16-17; Barnett, supra note 72, at
306-09; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 54, 56.
As a complete theory of contract obligation, reliance runs into problems of circularity. Not all reliance results in liability; it must be invited, orjustifiable. This leads to the
question of when reliance is invited or justifiable, which is deeply entangled with legal
definitions of duty. See Barnett, supra at 274-76; Craswell, supra note 142, at 498-501.
Nevertheless, with the aid of established conventions, it is possible to identify at least a
core area in which one person's broken promise can be said to cause another's reliance
loss. See P. Anrrv^, PROMISES, supra note 28, at 64-66.
Some consequentialists might be indifferent to this conclusion, except insofar as
breaking promises is an activity that should be deterred because it is likely to produce
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3. Is an Equitable Fairness Defense the Right Solution ?-The circumstances that support an equitable defense correspond in two
ways to the settings in which the reasons for an expectancy remedy
lose force. First, the transaction is likely to have taken place outside
a competitive market. This is due in part to the traditional rule that
specific performance is not available when damages are adequate.2 °6
Usually the reason why damages are unsatisfactory is that the subject matter of the contract cannot be duplicated in an active market.
Second, the facts that make out an equitable defense suggest
that defects in private choice have resulted in an imperfect expression of value. Typically the promisor is unsophisticated and therefore unlikely to have perfect information for calculation of value.
Often there is an identifiable mistake that makes the gap in information clear. A low price confirms that the contract is not the result of
rational interaction. It may seem tautological to rely on a discrepancy in price: a low price proves the choice was defective, and a
defective choice proves the price is not a correct statement of
value. 20 7 But I believe the price is a useful reference. A court cannot fix a universal "value" because value depends on personal preference. But it can tell when an agreed price is very far removed
from normal value, for no good reason.
Thus the compromise function of an equitable defense has
some support in terms of limits on the bargain principle. Courts
may have isolated a type of case in which there are no compelling
reasons for an expectancy remedy, but there are reasons to protect
against reliance loss. In response, they deny specific performance
and limit the promisee to a damage remedy that will not fully compensate lost expectations.
An equitable defense, however, is not an effective way to address faults in the bargain principle. Its impact on the promisee's
expectation interest is indirect and fortuitous; in some cases proof
of the value of performance is fairly complete, while in others both
expectancy and reliance losses are uncertain. Further, the rhetoric
of equitable defenses skews analysis by suggesting that the contract
obligation is unfair, when the problem is that full enforcement is
more harm than benefit. See Alexander, supra note 97. But for others, infliction of harm
through a breach of promise creates a duty of compensation. See P. ATmIAI, PROMISES,
supra note 28, at 192; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 55. See also Epstein, supra note
96.
206. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
207. See Seymour v. Delancey, 3 Cow. 445, 504-37 (N.Y. 1824), in which a considerable number of judges were impaled on the horns of this dilemma.
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unfair.2 0
There is no good reason why courts cannot address the shortcomings of the bargain principle directly. Courts should define an
area of cases in which reliance, rather than expectancy, is the correct
remedial goal. The choice of remedy should correspond to the reasons for an expectancy remedy and the circumstances in which those
reasons give way.
If courts accept the possibility of an alternative measure of damages, the fairness defense can be a useful point of reference. Its
common features are: (1) an individualized transaction, (2) an exchange that is removed from the competitive market by special characteristics of the subject matter, or by defective market conditions,
(3) a promisor who lacked general or specific information (in other
words, one who was unsophisticated or made a unilateral mistake)
and (4) a price that is perceptibly less than the value most people
would place on the promise. When these conditions are present,
and the court is reasonably confident that it can compensate reliance
8

loss,2 0 9 the remedy should shift from expectancy to reliance.21 0

C.

Acoustic Separation

So far, my explanations for equitable defenses have focused on
remedial problems. Some versions of the fairness defense are related to differences between specific and substitutional relief.
Others are rough compromises, which indicate that damage remedies need refinement.
Apart from these remedial issues, equitable defenses may serve
208. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 744, 798 (distinguishing between the existence of
obligation and the extent of enforcement).
209. The weakest link in this proposal is the court's ability to compensate reliance
loss. Reliance can take many forms, some of which are subtle and difficult to measure.
See 3 G. PALMER, supra note 22, § 15.9, at 441-42; R. POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.8, at 10910; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 28, at 60; Patterson, supra note 29, at 879-80. As a result,
the reliance remedy will not be a perfect one. On the other hand, there are cases in
which the court can see that the promisee has not changed her position substantially,
beyond a documented amount of out-of-pocket expense. See, e.g., Panco v. Rogers, 19
NJ. Super. 12, 20-21, 87 A.2d 770, 774 (Ch. Div. 1952) (sellers discovered their mistake
immediately, notified buyers and offered to reimburse buyers' expenses). And the court
can fortify the reliance remedy by relaxing the requirement of certainty in proof. See
Van Wagner Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enters., 67 N.Y.2d 186, 195-96, 492 N.E.2d
756, 761, 501 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633 (1986) (defendant who opposed specific performance
was estopped from arguing that damages were conjectural).
210. Several authors have suggested that the reliance measure of damages is appropriate when there are grounds for an equitable defense to specific performance, or in
other cases in which an expectancy remedy is excessive. See 2 G. PALMER, supra note 22,
§ 12.7, at 599-600; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 156, at 379-82.
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a third function: to accommodate conflicting values. 2 1 ' Part I suggested that the legal and equitable models of contract enforcement
correspond to different substantive values, as well as different formal approaches to law. If so, courts may be using the equitable defenses to pursue both sets of values at once. Equitable defenses
provide an opportunity to do this by creating a condition of "acoustic separation" in contract law.
1. The Concept of Acoustic Separation.-Acoustic separation is an
idea developed by Professor Meir Dan-Cohen in his observation of
criminal law.21 2 According to his analysis, laws have two functions.
They provide "conduct rules" to guide private actors, and "decision
rules" to guide officials who apply the law, after the fact, to the conduct of others.21 3 The justifications for legal rules as conduct rules
lie in policies about desirable conduct by members of society.21 4
The justifications for legal rules as decision rules lie in policies
about imposing punishment or liability on individuals. 21 5 We are
accustomed to think that directions for conduct and directions for
decisions in response to conduct must coincide in a single rule. If
norms relating to conduct conflict with norms related to decisions,
216
one set of norms (or both) must give way.
Acoustic separation raises the possibility that the conduct and
decision functions of legal rules can be separated. The term acoustic separation describes a legal environment in which decision rules
are disclosed only to official decisionmakers, and not to the public. 2 17 In a condition of perfect acoustic separation, decision rules
21
might differ in substance from the conduct rules they enforced.
211. This explanation differs in nature from those set out in the previous two subparts
of the Article. In each of those subparts, I suggested that what purports to be a fairness
defense based on "hardship" may conceal other motives. Courts may be denying equitable relief on the basis of unstated differences between damages and specific performance. In this subpart, I accept the rhetoric of the fairness defense and assume that it
embodies values that conflict with those expressed in legal defenses.
212. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 37.
213. Id. at 625-34. See also J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 147-56 (2d ed.
1980) (duty-imposing laws and sanction-imposing laws). Conduct and decision are not
completely satisfactory terms because both describe decisions: the citizen's decision to
act and an official's subsequent decision to attach particular legal consequences to the
citizen's action. I will continue to use the terms conduct and decision in the text,
although they cause difficulty at certain points.
214. Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 130.
215. Id. at 631.

216. Id.
217. See id. at 630.

218. Id.
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For example, a conduct rule might forbid certain behavior, while a
more lenient decision rule allowed judges to withhold sanctions in
appealing cases. From the point of view of a governing authority
overseeing the legal system, acoustic separation would allow the authority to pursue separate policies that are incompatible within a
single rule. 2 19
There is no perfect acoustic separation in the real world, 22 0 but
there may be conditions of partial acoustic separation, in which conduct rules and decision rules diverge. 22 ' Dan-Cohen has identified a
number of plausible examples in criminal law. He also suggests that
courts can foster acoustic separation through what he calls "strate2 22
gies of selective transmission.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 633-34. Partial acoustic separation can occur any time certain normative
messages are more likely to be understood by officials than by the public. Id.
222. See id at 634-48. Dan-Cohen's article is not an unqualified endorsement of selective transmission, either in general or in the criminal context from which he draws his
illustrations. He thinks it is possible, at least in some circumstances, to maintain separate conduct and decision rules without undermining the "rule of law." Id. at 668. But
he warns that both the utility and the moral acceptability of selective transmission depend on the manner and context of its application. Moreover, he admits that the idea is
distasteful from the perspective of those who are governed by law. See id. at 665-77. For
criticism, see Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicialCandor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731, 744-47 (1987);
Singer, On Classism and Dissonance in the Criminal Law: A Reply to ProfessorMeir Dan-Cohen,
77 J. CRIM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 69 (1986).

Professor Gerald Postema's book on the jurisprudence ofJeremy Bentham provides
an interesting parallel. G. PosTEmA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAw TRADITIoN (1986).

Postema attributes to Bentham a vision very similar to Dan-Cohen's model of acoustic
separation. See id. at 405-08. In Bentham's design (as interpreted by Postema), law is
embodied in a fixed, clear, and comprehensive code. Id. at 405. At the point of adjudication, however, judges decide cases by direct reference to the principle of utility. Id. at
405-06. The code enters into the judge's utilitarian calculus insofar as it generates private expectations. However, the code is not treated as determinative in decision making. Although judges' decisions would be publicly announced, they would have no
precedential value and therefore would not alter the conduct rules of the code. See id. at
403-08. In this way, says Postema, "Bentham's code appears Janus-faced. It presents
different aspects depending on whether one views it from the market-place or from the
bench." Id. at 449. Under Bentham's dual system (if it worked as Bentham supposed),
the code would offer certainty, while the adjudication would avoid the disutilities of
fixed rules.
Postema concludes with a powerful argument that Bentham's system is both unworkable and wrong. Id. at 453-64. On the practical question, Postema is certainly right
that decisions cannot be isolated systematically from conduct rules (especially when adjudication is publicly announced, as Bentham insisted it must be). Id. at 453-57. Nevertheless, I believe that there are areas of acoustic separation in law that permit a
discrepancy between conduct and decision rules. See infra section II(C)(2).
Postema also suggests that the division of adjudication and law violates a "moral
demand, a requirement of fairness or perhaps 'integrity.'" G. POSTEMA, supra, at 457. I
agree that a system in which conduct and decision rules diverge is morally imperfect.
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Dan-Cohen described selective transmission in terms of substantive goals of the legal system: conduct rules and decision rules
may diverge when social objectives conflict with notions of individual justice. 223 The same concept is useful in considering problems
of form. 2 24 In other words, a governing authority might conclude
that it is best for citizens to act according to determinate rules, but
that officials who apply law retrospectively should be guided by less
determinate standards. 2 In a condition of acoustic separation, the
authority could use each formal mode to its best advantage.
There are several reasons why the authority might choose to
present law to citizens in the form of rules. Rules are effective for
22 6
deterrent purposes because their command is understandable.
But as I will explain, I am willing in some settings to compromise integrity in the interest

of utility and justice. See infra notes 257-264 and accompanying text.
Postema's final argument is difficult to set aside. He points out that in the system

Bentham proposes, the public is virtually foreclosed from an active role in shaping the
law. See G. PosTEMA, supra, at 462. If adjudication is kept separate from law-making, and
has no prospective impact on conduct rules, there will be no occasion or incentive for
private parties to debate the law in terms of public good. See id. Parties to adjudication
will confine their arguments to retrospective adjustment between parties. As a result,
public participation in law-making will be limited to passive functions of review and recall. See id at 459-62. The same criticism applies to acoustic separation, to the extent
that legal argument in litigation is directed to rules that operate only as decision rules.
This is an important argument. The best answer I can give is that this Article addresses selective transmission on an occasional rather than a systemic basis. The type of
selective transmission discussed here will not result in a general exclusion of reasoned
argument from adjudication.
223. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 632-34 ("The law faces a hopeless trade-off
between the competing values of deterrence and compassion (or fairness).").
224. The formal version of selective transmission stands up better than its substantive
counterpart to some lines of criticism. When there is a substantive gap between conduct
and decision rules, the published rule may appear unjust to citizens because it omits
values that are reflected in an undisclosed decision rule. See Singer, supra note 222, at
90. This problem does not disappear when conduct and decision rules diverge in form,
but it may be less severe. Citizens may agree that rules are necessary to govern conduct
and accept that the published law is as perfect as it can be in the form of a rule.
225. As described earlier, I consider a rule to be a direction in neutral, determinate
terms that dictates the consequences of certain facts without the need for normative
evaluation. A standard states a norm, which the decisionmaker must apply directly to
particular cases as they arise. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
In defining rules as I do, I am assuming that language can constrain decisions, at
least in a core area of understanding. See Schauer, supra note 82, at 520-32. I am assuming also that legal rules can and do have some content that is referable solely to the
social institution of law, without the need for further moral assessment by the law-applier. SeeJ. RAz, supra note 82, at 37-52.
226. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 82, at 262 (noting also that rules are less likely
than standards to chill desirable conduct); Schlag, supra note 82, at 384. There are
counterarguments, to the effect that standards are better deterrents because rules allow
actors to come *closer to the line of prohibited conduct. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at
1695-96; Schlag, supra note 82, at 384-85. The weight of such an argument depends on
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They also provide a framework for private planning by making life
predictable.2 2 7 This is especially true in contract law because contract law provides the background rules for a vital social practice.2 28
The clearer the rules, the more accessible the practice will be.
Further, direct application of norms by citizens, without the
guidance of a rule, is prone to several types of error. Individual
actors may not have the information or objectivity necessary to
make an accurate assessment of the consequences of their conduct.2 2 9 Moreover, even if their own calculations are sound, they
cannot coordinate their conduct with the conduct of others.23 ° The
authority, in fashioning a rule, can avoid these errors because it regards conduct from a central position, and because it can coerce a
coordinated response. 2 3 '
. The trouble with rules is that they are certain to produce the
wrong result in some of the cases they govern. A rule is a generalization: it dictates consequences that must follow whenever certain
facts are present. As a result, applications of the rule will be underinclusive and overinclusive-they will not always conform to the
norm the rule is intended to implement. 2 2 Yet the authority may
conclude that overall, fewer errors will result with a rule than would
whether conduct close to the line should be discouraged or protected in the context at
issue.
227. See Powers, supra note 82, at 1274; Schauer, supra note 82, at 539.
228. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1697-98; Powers, supra note 82, at 1274-76. On
the role of legal rules in establishing procedures for private ordering, see H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPr OF LAw 27-28 (1961); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 24-29
(1955) (practice conception of rules).
229. See Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHics 315, 317-18 (1985); Powers, supra note 82, at 1273. But cf. Wonnell, supra note 131, at 456-57 (describing the
daunting informational difficulties of central planning with respect to, say, zinc).
230. See Alexander, supra note 229, at 318 (prisoners' dilemmas). Professor Alexander points out that these errors affect individual applications of any consequentialist
theory, whether the decisionmaker is pursuing utility, equality, self-interest, or some
other goal. Id. at 316-17, 318.
231. I am not suggesting that a rule is always the better choice for regulation of conduct. There are good reasons why lawmakers might prefer a standard, particularly when
they enter a new field still subject to factual and normative uncertainties. See H.L.A.
HART, supra note 228, at 121-23. See also Powers, supra note 82, at 1279-85 (disutilities of
obedience to rules).
At least with respect to exchanges of goods, the argument for rules is especially
strong in contract law, because the parties' main object is to plan for future exchange.
In a relational setting, a standard may be a better guide for conduct, much in the way
that a standard is needed in a developing field of law. Cf. I. MAcNEIL, supra note 42, at
59-70 (discrete and relational norms).
232. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 82, at 268; Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1695-96;
Powers, supra note 82, at 1280-81; Schauer, supra note 82, at 534-35, 539 ("Rules doom
decision making to mediocrity by mandating the inaccessibility of excellence.").
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occur without the rule where each citizen applied the governing
norm directly.
Although a rule may be the right choice from the authority's
point of view, there remains a problem of obedience by citizens.
Citizens cannot simply obey legal rules. As long as they are rational
beings, they must act according to their assessment of reasons for
action. 23 3 Those reasons include the various benefits of obeying the
rule (for example, I may trust my own calculation but mistrust the
calculations of others and expect that they will err if they deviate
from the rule; therefore, I may follow the rule so that others will
follow the rule). 2 ' But it is not rational for citizens to follow the
rule when their own balance of all reasons (including the benefits of
a rule) favors a different result. This means that if the authority is to
accomplish its goal, it must alter the balance of reasons presented to
the citizen. In other words, it must introduce an artificial factor to
the citizen's decision.
One way to alter the citizen's reasons for action is to back the
rule with a sanction. The rational citizen will still weigh relevant
considerations. But the sanction adds a reason that should (if the
penalty is calculated correctly) tip the balance in favor of the rule.
A sanction, however, raises other difficulties. To preserve the
benefits of the rule, the sanction must apply even in those cases in
which the rule is overinclusive. In a criminal case, this means the
judge must punish the citizen even if the citizen's action was justified. In a contract case, it means the judge must enforce the con233. Others may not agree with this statement. Professor Schauer, for example, has
described a range of possible responses to legal rules. At one extreme is rule-based
decisionmaking, in which the rule is "opaque": the decisionmaker follows it without
considering whether the result it dictates is the best result. She does not look behind
the rule to see whether the case before her fits its background justifications, nor does she
consult the universe of other reasons for decision. At the other extreme is particularistic
decisionmaking, in which the rule is "transparent": the decision maker consults not
only the rule but the reasons for the rule and all other reasons relevant to the outcome
of the case. If other reasons are persuasive the rule gives way. Between the two extremes are particularistic decisions that acknowledge the values served by obedience to
rules ("rule-sensitive particularism") and decisions that give a degree of presumptive or
exclusionary force to the existence of a rule. Schauer, Rules and the Rtile of Law (forthcoming in HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y). See alsoJ. RAz, supra note 82, at 16-19 (exclusionary
rules).
I do not intend here to enter into the debate over the authority of law and the duty
to obey law. But I do not believe it is possible, from the point of view of the citizen, for a
legal rule (as such) to exclude consideration of other reasons for action, including the
various reasons for following the rule. The position I find most persuasive is Professor
Larry Alexander's. See Alexander, Law and Exclusionay Reasons, 18 PHIL. Topics 5 (forthcoming 1991).
234. The problem of "contagion" is discussed in Powers, supra note 82, at 1271-72.
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tract even if the bargain is seriously one-sided. Decisions of this
kind impose hardship on the individuals they affect, and they force
judges to decide against their own assessment of the right result.23 5
Acoustic separation suggests a way for the authority to escape
this dilemma, by deceiving citizens about the force of the rule in
official decisions. In other words, the authority might hold out to
private parties a determinate rule, with implicit or explicit instructions that the rule will be enforced by courts. At the same time, it
might provide courts with a less determinate standard that calls for
direct application of the underlying norm to particular cases. If this
standard can be obscured from public view, it will not affect the
weight of the rule in the citizens' calculations. The authority can
capture the value of rules at the level of public conduct, but leave
judicial decisions open to a broader range of justifications.
2. Acoustic Separation Applied to Contract Enforcement.- The distinction between legal and equitable enforcement of contracts creates a condition of partial acoustic separation. Substantive contract
law says that contracts are enforceable, subject to standardized defenses. If parties look past the substantive law to remedies, the primary remedial rule says that the promisee is entitled to the value of
the bargain (in kind or in money) in case of breach. The equitable
fairness defense looks unimportant, because it affects only specific
relief and not damages. In fact, the damage remedy often does not
enforce the promisee's bargain in full. 23 6 But to perceive the gap in
enforcement, the parties must not only be aware that there are special defenses to equitable relief, but also understand the defects in
the damage remedy.
That is unlikely to happen. Remedies are remote from lay understandings of law. Equitable remedies, and the various secondary
limitations on damages that make specific performance important,
are remoter still. Thus it is possible that the legal model of enforcement serves as the conduct rule for contracting parties, while the
fairness defense operates as a hidden decision rule (or as a hidden
exception to rule-based decision making).
There is also a temporal separation between the legal rule of
enforcement and the equitable fairness defense, which is important
235. See Alexander, supra note 233; Alexander, supra note 229, at 324-25. The authority might force judges to comply by imposing further sanctions up the ladder of decisionmaking. At some point, however, this will not be feasible and someone will have to
depart from the rule, or decide against the balance of reasons.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 138-48.
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because it affects the conduct of lawyers. Lawyers may not explore
the question of remedies fully when they give advice at the stage of
transaction. Only after a breach, when decisional issues take on
practical importance, will the lawyer penetrate to the decision rule.
The foundation is in place, therefore, for selective transmission
of rules governing contract enforcement. With respect to the content of the transmission, legal and equitable defenses fit well into
the logic of acoustic separation. There is a correspondence, in both
substance and form, between legal and equitable defenses and the
conduct and decision functions of law. The legal model of enforcement is conduct-oriented and rule-based. The equitable model is
better suited to remedial goals and particularistic decisionmaking.
In an earlier subpart of this Article, I described three values
associated with the legal model of contract enforcement- the social
utility of a market economy, efficient allocation of resources, and
respect for personal autonomy.2 3 7 The first two are distinctly conduct-oriented. Both seek to channel private conduct in ways that
promote their conception of social good. Further, these two theories of enforcement are not at all concerned with judicial decisions.
This makes them good candidates for selective transmission. A decision to impose sanctions or liability in an individual case is important only to the extent that the outcome of the case will inform
future conduct. In a condition of acoustic separation, a decision
rule that mitigates the enforcement of contract law would have no
impact on utility or efficiency.
To the extent that the legal model of enforcement is driven by a
theory of individual autonomy or consent, the case for selective
transmission breaks down. Theories of this kind require conduct
rules-but their object is to define a sphere of individual rights,
rather than to channel conduct. Further, they assume that a promise made voluntarily and according to governing conventions creates a moral obligation from one individual to another. In a system
of individual rights and duties there can be only one legal rule,
which must apply both to conduct and to subsequent enforcement
decisions.
On the legal side, therefore, the value of selective transmission
depends on which theory of contract obligation is at work. For
those who believe that the binding force of promises is moral and
follows from personal autonomy, selective transmission will be unacceptable in contract law. But for those concerned with utility or
237. See supra subpart I(A).
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efficiency, the objectives of the legal model can be accomplished in
conduct rules, and need not be carried over to decision rules.
Turning to the equitable model of enforcement, the values associated with equitable defenses relate to justice between individuals. They are concerned with alleviating the unfair results of
particular agreements, 2 3 rather than creating an environment for
commercial exchange. They are retrospective, requiring a degree of
altruism or humanity when the promisor's choice turns out to be an
error and will cause her substantial loss. 23 9 They are primarily decisional values rather than conduct values.
If these characterizations are correct, equitable defenses can be
understood as a means of harmonizing conflicting values through
acoustic separation. Their obscurity permits a division between
conduct rules and decisions. The legal model of enforcement tells
the public that contracts will be enforced, while the equitable model
gives relief from hardship in particular cases. Both models serve
desirable ends: one furthers market utility, the other furthers justice. They cannot coexist in one rule, but an equitable fairness defense allows courts to pursue both ends at once.2 40 This use of
equitable defenses-as a device to separate conduct and decision
rules-is not consistent with a liberal or libertarian moral theory of
contract law, but it is well suited to utilitarian goals.
3. Is Acoustic Separation Acceptable?-Acoustic separation can
produce a greater combination of justice and utility than would be
possible if conduct and decision rules were fully publicized. 2 4 ' On
the other hand, it is hard to accept deception as an element of our
legal system, even if it serves good purposes. 4 2
A preliminary question is whether selective transmission is feasible. It is not, in any systematic way. Leaks would occur, and a leak
could undermine both the effect of the conduct rule and public con238. See supra subpart I(B).
239. See id.
240. I am not suggesting that the traditional distinction between legal and equitable
defenses is a conscious and deliberate use of acoustic separation. At most, courts may
be vaguely aware that the obscurity of equitable defenses permits them to give relief
without impairing the public perception of security in contract transactions.
241. This discussion assumes the best possible setting, in which conduct and decision
rules are promulgated by a legitimate lawmaking authority acting in the best interests of
society. This is a large assumption, but I am not ready to discuss the political aspects of
acoustic separation.
242. Dean Singer is scandalized. See Singer, supra note 222, at 73, 84-87. Professor
Shapiro is troubled. See Shapiro, supra note 222, at 744-47. Dan-Cohen himself is reluctant. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 665-66, 677.
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fidence in the legal system. But these considerations do not rule out
more casual forms of selective transmission, in which judges take
advantage of various naturally occurring conditions of partial acoustic separation. At least in arcane areas of contract enforcement,
these conditions can continue undetected for some time.
Aside from practical problems, selective transmission raises serious questions about the relationship of law and legal decisionmakers to those who are governed by law. When a legal system engages in selective transmission, it institutionalizes the esoteric character of law. The whole law is known to some and not to others.243
This leads to a series of possible objections. First, a system in
which part of the law is undisclosed might be open to official
abuse. 244 The likelihood of abuse, however, depends on the nature
of the applicable decision rule. If the hidden decision rule is a rule
that can be exploited-for example, a contract is not enforceable if
the promisor crossed her fingers-those who know the rules will be
able to profit from their position. But when the decision rule is a
justified exception to harsh applications of a conduct rule, it is not
likely to work to the benefit of officials. An equitable defense based
on unanticipated hardship or unilateral mistake is not easy to
manipulate.
Even if officials derive no special advantage from selective
transmission, a system in which decision rules are reserved to a limited group might be charged with elitism. Someone knows better
than the rest of us what is best; otherwise we could be trusted with
the whole law. 245 But selective transmission is not really an elitist
idea. Decision rules are withheld from the public not because those
* inauthority have superior moral judgment, but because their central
* position enables them to make the law work in the best possible
way. 246 They can accommodate competing values by dividing the
243. In Professor Dan-Cohen's model of perfect acoustic separation, not only are decision rules screened from the public, but conduct rules are screened from official decisionmakers. Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 630-31. But in a case of partial acoustic
separation, which is the only acoustic separation possible in the real world, decision
makers are aware of both conduct and decision rules.
244. See Singer, supra note 222, at 85-87.
245. See Shapiro, supra note 222, at 745-46; Singer, supra note 222, at 95-96. A related
argument is that when law deceives those it governs, it insults their dignity and autonomy. In the words of Dr. Joseph Raz, a system of clear and open law is virtuous because
it "presupposes that [those it governs] are rational and autonomous creatures and attempts to affect their actions and habits by affecting their deliberations." J. RAz, supra
note 82, at 222.
246. See generally Powers, supra note 82, at 1268-93 (discussing the utilitarian benefits
of three features of law: its centrality, its coercive power, and its formality).
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conduct and decision functions of law. Or, by casting conduct rules
as rules and decision rules as standards, they can obtain the benefits
of rules without the cost of overinclusive applications. In either case,
it is their position of authority, rather than their personal characteristics, that justifies secrecy.
The hardest objections to overcome are based on the ideal of
the "rule of law." '2 4 7 It is generally understood that to maintain the
rule of law, laws must be open and clear to citizens.2 48 Selective transmission, by definition, seems to violate that standard.
Dan-Cohen addressed this problem at some length when he first set
out his ideas on acoustic separation. 24 9 His tentative conclusion was
that at least in some circumstances, it is possible to maintain separate conduct and decision rules without serious damage to the values served by the rule of law.2 5 °
The greatest obstacle Dan-Cohen encountered as he tried to
reconcile selective transmission with the rule of law was its impact
on the liberty and autonomy of citizens.2 5 1 He put the problem this
way: a system governed by clear and open laws promotes liberty
and autonomy by enabling individuals to plan for pursuit of their
247. See Singer, supra note 222, at 98-100 ("The core of the problem with Dan-Cohen's position is that it advocates falsehood precisely where truth is not only desirable
from a utilitarian standpoint, but demanded from a moral standpoint.... [R]ules of law
should reflect the community sense of acceptable conduct.").
248. In Dan-Cohen's words, the rule of law requires that "laws be clearly stated and
publicly proclaimed." Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 667. Dan-Cohen's conception of
the rule of law closely follows Raz's. SeeJ. RAz, supra note 82, ch. 11; Dan-Cohen, supra
note 37, at 667 n.114.
249. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 667-73.
250. See id. at 665-67.
251. Dan-Cohen proposed that the requirement of clear and open laws serves four
objectives: to limit officials' discretion, to enable law to govern citizens (an "instrumental" function), to assist citizens in rational calculation (a "utilitarian" function), and to
protect individual liberty and autonomy. Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 668-71.
Dan-Cohen had no difficulty reconciling selective transmission with the instrumental and utilitarian objectives of the rule of law, because both are satisfied so long as
conduct rules are clear and public. See id. at 668-69. He also concluded that official
decisions can be sufficiently controlled by means of decision rules addressed to the decisionmaker, without the need for publicity. See id. at 668. This conclusion might be accurate in a world of perfect acoustic separation, but it is less persuasive in the case of real,
partial acoustic separation. If the decision rule is obscure, officials may not apply it
consistently. Further, in a formal version of selective transmission, decision "rules" may
be open-ended standards that promote particularistic decisionmaking at the expense of
restraint. Nevertheless, I will assume that decision rules have a determinate enough
content and are sufficiently open to reason and debate at the point of application to
fulfill the restraining function of the rule of law. Cf.Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 H,v.L. REV. 353, 372-82 (1978) (nature and requirements of adjudication
according to the rule of law).
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chosen ends.' 5 2 Hidden decision rules frustrate this function of
53

law.

2

Dan-Cohen had several answers to this objection, in the context
he considered. The example he worked from was a criminal conduct rule modified by a more lenient, acoustically separate decision
rule. He noted first that a defendant who is excused by a lenient
decision rule has no cause to complain. 2 4 But this does not end the
inquiry, because the defendant is not the only person affected: a discrepancy between conduct and decision rules also affects potential
defendants who are deterred by the conduct rule. But in Dan-Cohen's view, the choice denied them-to violate the law without sanction-is outside the sphere of morally protected autonomy, because
it is not a choice according to moral duty.2 5 5
I do not think the impact on autonomy can be explained away
so easily, unless one takes a strict view of moral duty to obey law. In
any case of selective transmission, the law that citizens see is imperfect.2 56 It omits a set of values that may have moral importance, but
have been relegated for consequential reasons to a hidden decision
rule. If we are morally bound to obey law, as law, then perhaps
there is no conflict between selective transmission and autonomy.
But if moral duty is not coextensive with legal duty, selective transmission will sometimes infringe on the autonomy of those who are
deterred by a conduct rule. 5 7 On the other hand, the damage to
autonomy is closely circumscribed; it affects only the range of action
2 58
between conduct and decision rules.

With respect to liberty, Dan-Cohen conceded that selective
transmission restricts freedom of action, by threatening a sanction
that may not be imposed.2 59 His response was that overall, selective
transmission has a positive effect on freedom of action, because it
avoids the choice between a stricter decision rule or a conduct rule
that offers less protection against interference by others. 26° This ar252. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 670; J. RAz, supra note 82, at 220-23.
253. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 670.
254. See id. at 671.
255. See id. at 671 (referring to autonomy "in the Kantian sense").
256. I think this is what Dean Singer has in mind when he refers to a "sterile positivist
position." See Singer, supra note 222, at 99.
257. For review and analysis of different conceptions of the duty to obey law, see
Powers, supra note 82.
258. Any legal rule that is a rule-in other words, any general rule that is overinclusive in application-has a similar impact on autonomy. I am grateful to Professor Larry
Alexander for pointing this out.
259. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 672.
260. See id.
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gument assumes, however, that liberty is fungible. It may be that
the benefits of selective transmission justify a certain loss of liberty
to those who are deterred by conduct rules, but they do not cancel it
out. It is still a cost to be considered.
When selective transmission is introduced to contract enforcement, its relation to autonomy and liberty becomes more complex.
To give the problem shape, assume that a promisor and promisee
have agreed to a sale of land. The promisee has acted in good faith,
but due to a mistake or changed circumstances, the promisor will
suffer a severe hardship if the bargain is enforced. The governing
conduct rule provides that promises are enforced in the absence of
fraud or mutual mistake. The decision rule provides that promises
will not be fully enforced in a case like this; the court will deny specific performance and damages will not duplicate the promisee's lost
bargain. To make the case easier, assume also that the court can
compensate the promisee for out-of-pocket losses. 2 6 '
Conduct rules have a special role in this setting. The main
function of criminal conduct rules is to impose duties-to define
and deter undesirable conduct.2 62 Contract rules have a second
function, which is to confer power on private parties to create rights
and duties between themselves. 26 3 In the terminology of Professor
2
H.L.A. Hart, they are secondary rules. 11
More accurately, a rule of contract enforcement has two aspects. First, it tells promisors to keep their promises. In this role, it
is a primary (duty-imposing) rule. Second, it tells both promisor
and promisee that if they have followed the rules of contract formation, the promisee's expectations will be enforced. In this aspect, it
is a secondary (power-conferring) rule.
When a rule of contract enforcement is viewed as a primary rule
directing promisors to honor their promises, the impact of selective
transmission on autonomy and liberty is much the same as it is in
261. Courts may take this into account in deciding whether to allow an equitable defense. See Panco v.Rogers, 19 NJ. Super. 12, 16, 87 A.2d 770, 774 (Ch. Div. 1952).
262. Dan-Cohen, supra note 37, at 649.
263. H.L.A. HART, supra note 228, chs. 3 & 5.

264. Professor Hart's taxonomy of rules, and his explanation of the place of primary
and secondary rules in a legal system, is set out in H.L.A. HART,id. Another discussion
of the role of legal rules in establishing social "practices" is set out in Rawls, supra note
228. Rawls characterized the system of criminal punishment as a "practice," in which
rules serve to confer and define powers, but his focus was on criminal decision rules
rather than conduct rules. See id. at 30-31. See also P. A'rYAH, PROMISES, supra note 28, at
106-22 (questioning whether contract rules have a significant "constitutive" role); J.
RAz, supra note 213, at 156-66 ("P-laws").
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criminal law. There will be a certain, limited loss of liberty and autonomy to those who perform their promises when they might have
found refuge in an equitable defense.
When the rule is viewed as a secondary rule that sets the stage
for private ordering, the impact of selective transmission changes.
Most important, selective transmission affects promisees, by defeating their expectation that private arrangements will be backed by
legal sanctions. In some cases, the promisee has violated background norms. For example, she may have taken knowing advantage of an unsophisticated promisor. If so, she cannot complain.
But there are other situations-such as a unilateral mistake or a dramatic change in circumstances-in which the promisee is blameless.
In this case, there is no way around the conclusion that an obscure decision rule interferes with both liberty and autonomy. The
legal system first invited the promisee to engage in the practice of
contracting, then frustrated her expectation of enforcement. The
effect of selective transmission cannot be discounted on grounds of
moral or legal duty, because the conduct rules the promisee followed were powers, available for individuals to use at their option.
If the whole law were clear, the promisee might have made another
choice. As a result, her interest in autonomy and freedom of action
is much harder to dismiss than the interest of someone who is
moved by a false threat of sanction to comply with a primary rule.
On the other hand, the argument that the sum of liberty will be
increased by selective transmission is especially strong in contract
enforcement. A rule of strict enforcement enlarges the power that
contract law confers on private parties. But without selective transmission of lenient defenses, the impulse of judges to do justice in
particular cases would erode the rule and the benefit it provides for
pursuit of individual and social ends.
I am not happy with the idea of acoustic separation. It points
out the ways in which individuals fail at self-government and the
need for centralized rules to govern them. It infringes on liberty
and autonomy, particularly in contract law, where conduct rules are
power-conferring rules, and there is no violation of duty in declining to follow them. On the other hand, effective social ordering requires some disregard of individual autonomy. Therefore, at least
with respect to the economic interests at stake in contract law, I am
willing to accept some deception in the application of law.
Even for those who believe selective transmission has no place
in our legal system, the concept of acoustic separation is useful for
the insight it provides into contract law. It shows that courts may
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pursue two different ends through legal rules- regulation of conduct and regulation of decisions. And the relation of these two ends
to traditional legal and equitable models of contract enforcement

helps to clarify the choices involved in adopting and interpreting the
defense of unconscionability. When a court accepts the unconscionability defense without reservation, it is focusing on individual decisions rather than general regulation of conduct. If it narrows and

defines the defense, making it more rule-like, its attention is on conduct rather than decisions.
CONCLUSION

Equitable defenses to specific performance reflect formal and
substantive values that differ from the values associated with traditional legal defenses. Yet there is no modem reason to associate
one set of values with equitable remedies and one with legal remedies. This Article has considered several alternative explanations.
In some instances there are differences between specific and
substitutional relief that call for a special defense to specific performance. This explanation is persuasive as far as it goes, but it applies only to a limited field of cases. It does not support the general
proposition that contract defenses should be more lenient when the
promisee seeks equitable relief.
In other cases, specific performance is not appropriate because

there is no strong reason to protect the promisee's expectation interest in the contract. Here, the equitable fairness defense should
be replaced with a revised view of contract enforcement. There are
cases in which it is appropriate to protect against reliance loss, but
not to give an expectancy remedy of any kind, specific or substitutional. Rather than relying on equitable defenses as a rough compromise, courts should define the sphere of contracts in which
protection of reliance interests is the proper remedial goal.
The most difficult question is how the legal system should respond to the different values represented by legal and equitable defenses to contract enforcement. In current law, the equitable model
of enforcement may be gaining ground. In particular, the unconscionability provisions of the UCC and the second Restatement of Contracts have expanded legal defenses and chosen a standard in favor
of rules.
The concept of acoustic separation illustrates the formal and
substantive relation of the two traditional models of enforcement to
regulation of conduct and regulation of decisions. One emphasizes
social ordering, another emphasizes individual justice. Equitable
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defenses permit courts to pursue both ends, because they operate in
a condition of partial acoustic separation. This arrangement may or
may not be legitimate, but it does shed light on the choices
presented by a legal defense of unconscionability.

